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Kin selection theory is a kind of causal analysis. The initial form of kin selection ascribed cause
to costs, benefits, and genetic relatedness. The theory then slowly developed a deeper and more
sophisticated approach to partitioning the causes of social evolution. Controversy followed because
causal analysis inevitably attracts opposing views. It is always possible to separate total effects into
different component causes. Alternative causal schemes emphasize different aspects of a problem,
reflecting the distinct goals, interests, and biases of different perspectives. For example, group se-
lection is a particular causal scheme with certain advantages and significant limitations. Ultimately,
to use kin selection theory to analyze natural patterns and to understand the history of debates
over different approaches, one must follow the underlying history of causal analysis. This article
describes the history of kin selection theory, with emphasis on how the causal perspective improved
through the study of key patterns of natural history, such as dispersal and sex ratio, and through a
unified approach to demographic and social processes. Independent historical developments in the
multivariate analysis of quantitative traits merged with the causal analysis of social evolution by
kin selectionabc.
As is often the case, once a topic has become
in vogue, its name ceases to have meaning . . .
[1].
INTRODUCTION
Ideas are embedded in their history and language.
Hamilton’s [2] theories of inclusive fitness and kin se-
lection are good examples. As understanding deepened,
the original ideas transformed into broader concepts of
selection and evolutionary process. With that general-
ization, the initial language that remains associated with
the topic has become distorted. The confused language
and haphazard use of incorrect historical context have
led to significant misunderstanding and meaningless ar-
gument.
Current understanding transcends the initial interpre-
tation of ‘kin selection,’ which attaches to some notion
of similarity by descent from a recent common ancestor.
The other candidate phrases, such as ‘inclusive fitness’
or ‘group selection,’ also have problems. We are left with
a topic that derives from those antecedent notions and
clearly has useful application to those biological puzzles.
At the same time, the modern understanding of altruism
connects to the analysis of selection on multiple charac-
ters, to interactions between different species, and to the
broadest generalizations of the theory of natural selec-
tion.
A good scholarly history of kin selection and its descen-
dants has yet to be written. Here, I give a rough histor-
ical outline in the form of a nonmathematical narrative
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(see Box 2). I describe the history from my personal per-
spective. Because I worked actively on the subject over
several decades, I perceive the history by the ways in
which my own understanding changed over time. Box 3
highlights other perspectives and key citations.
EARLY HISTORY
According to Darwin [3], natural selection favors traits
that enhance individual reproduction. Puzzles arise
when traits reduce individual reproduction while provid-
ing aid to others. In this context, Fisher [4] discussed the
problem of warning coloration in mimicry:
[D]istastefulness . . . is obviously capable of
giving protection to the species as a whole,
through its effect upon the instinctive or ac-
quired responses of predators, yet since any
individual tasted would seem almost bound
to perish, it is difficult to perceive how indi-
vidual increments of the distasteful quality,
beyond the average level of the species, could
confer any individual advantage.
Fisher then gave one possible solution:
[W]ith gregarious larvae the effect will cer-
tainly be to give the increased protection es-
pecially to one particular group of larvae,
probably brothers and sisters of the individ-
ual attacked. The selective potency of the
avoidance of brothers will of course be only
half as great as if the individual itself were
protected; against this is to be set the fact
that it applies to the whole of a possibly nu-
merous brood. . . . The ideal of heroism has
been developed among such peoples consider-
ably beyond the optimum of personal advan-
tage, and its evolution is only to be explained,
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2in terms of known causes, by the advantage
which it confers, by repute and prestige, upon
the kindred of the hero.
Haldane [5] restated Fisher’s argument. Williams and
Williams [6] presented a specific and limited analysis,
which they applied to altruism in social insects. Some
rather vague models considered more diffuse forms of
genetic similarity created by population structuring of
groups [7, 8]. These analyses hinted at a more general
concept. However, none of them expressed the deeper
principle in a clear and convincing way.
Hamilton’s rule
Hamilton [9, 10, 11] initiated modern approaches by
expressing a rule for the increase in an altruistic behavior
rB − C > 0. (1)
Here, C is the cost to an actor for performing the al-
truistic behavior, B is the benefit gained by a recipient
of the altruistic act, and r measures the relatedness be-
tween actor and recipient. The idea is that the actor pays
a personal cost in reduced reproduction for helping an-
other individual, the recipient gains increased reproduc-
tion from the altruistic act, and the relatedness translates
the recipient’s enhanced reproduction back to the actor’s
valuation of that extra reproduction. When the benefit
back to the actor, rB, is greater than the actor’s direct
cost, C, then the behavior is favored by natural selection.
Hamilton figured out how to measure r by analyzing
population genetic models. With the methods Hamilton
used in those early papers, he was only able to give a
rough description for the proper measure for relatedness.
His initial expression in terms of the genetic correlation
between actor and recipient was in the right direction
and was later refined by Hamilton [2].
Hamilton also defined a new and more general notion
of fitness, which he called ‘inclusive fitness.’ Instead of
counting the number of offspring by an individual, in-
clusive fitness makes a more extensive calculation of how
phenotypes influence the transmission of genes from one
generation to the next. In the inclusive fitness interpre-
tation, eqn 1 describes the changes in direct and indirect
reproduction associated with each change in behavior.
Thus, the inclusive fitness of a particular behavioral act
is the indirect reproductive gain through the recipient,
B, multiplied by the relatedness, r, minus the loss in di-
rect reproduction, C. The relatedness, r, measures the
genetic discount of substituting the reproduction of the
recipient in place of the reproduction of the actor.
All of the direct and indirect fitness changes are
assigned to the actor. This assignment of the different
pathways of genetic transmission to the actor associates
all fitness changes with the behavior that caused those
changes. Hamilton viewed this inclusive assignment
Box 1. Topics in the theory of natural selection
This article is part of a series on natural selection. Although
the theory of natural selection is simple, it remains endlessly
contentious and difficult to apply. My goal is to make more ac-
cessible the concepts that are so important, yet either mostly
unknown or widely misunderstood. I write in a nontechni-
cal style, showing the key equations and results rather than
providing full derivations or discussions of mathematical prob-
lems. Boxes list technical issues and brief summaries of the
literature.
Box 2. Scope
Most research in biology is empirical, yet em-
pirical studies rely fundamentally on theoretical
work for generating testable predictions and in-
terpreting observations. Despite this interdepen-
dence, many empirical studies build largely on
other empirical studies with little direct reference
to relevant theory, suggesting a failure of commu-
nication that may hinder scientific progress. . . .
The density of equations in an article has a sig-
nificant negative impact on citation rates, with
papers receiving 28% fewer citations overall for
each additional equation per page in the main
text. Long, equation-dense papers tend to be
more frequently cited by other theoretical papers,
but this increase is outweighed by a sharp drop
in citations from nontheoretical papers [12].
This article contains no equations beyond a few summary
expressions. I do not write for other theoreticians. I do not
attempt to be comprehensive. Rather, I try to evoke some
lines of thought that I believe will be helpful to scientists who
want to know about the theory.
A rough idea about the theory aids empirical study. It also
helps to cope with the onslaught of theoretical articles. Those
theoretical articles often claim to shift the proper framing of
fundamental issues. The literature never seems to come to a
consensus.
Here, I attempt to translate a few of the key points into
nonmathematical summaries. Such translation necessarily
loses essential components of understanding. Yet it seems
worthwhile to express the main issues in way that can be un-
derstood by a wider audience. Refer to my earlier work for
mathematical aspects of the theory and for citations to the
technical literature [13–19].
of all genetic consequences to the original causal behavior
as the key to his approach. The proper way of doing the
calculation was the major theoretical advance. Hamilton
[2] emphasized this causal perspective:
Considerations of genetical kinship can give a
statistical reassociation of the [fitness] effects
with the individuals that cause them.
Hamilton’s 1970 paper also greatly advanced the analysis
by using Price’s equation [20]. With this method, Hamil-
3ton established the correct measure for genetic similarity,
r, between actor and recipient. That measure turned out
to be the regression coefficient of the recipient’s geno-
type in relation to the actor’s genotype. That regression
is the value needed to establish a proper measure of in-
clusive fitness. Hamilton noted that the regression was
the exact measure only in his particular models. He ar-
gued that the regression measure would extend, at least
approximately, to a wide variety of other assumptions.
Roughly speaking, r translates the actor’s deviation in
gene frequency from the population average to the recip-
ient’s deviation in gene frequency from the population
average. Thus, recipient’s reproduction has consequence
for gene frequency change that is r multiplied by what
the same fitness increment in the actor would cause to
gene frequency change [15, 21, p. 49].
Comparison of different approaches
Already by 1975, different lines of thought on altru-
ism had developed. Hamilton [22, pp. 336–337] gave his
opinion:
The usefulness of the ‘inclusive fitness’ ap-
proach to social behaviour (i.e. an approach
using criteria like [rB − C > 0]) is that it is
more general than the ‘group selection’, ‘kin
selection’, or ‘reciprocal altruism’ approaches
and so provides an overview even where re-
gression coefficients [r] and fitness effects [B
and C] are not easy to estimate or specify.
For Hamilton, his rule was a way to clarify biological un-
derstanding and to develop qualitative hypotheses about
the causes of adaptation. Hamilton did not think of his
rule as replacing the way in which one did calculations
for models of population genetics. Indeed, he always con-
sidered the classical population genetics theory as the
primary truth. He then evaluated his own methods in
light of how well they could capture, in a simple way, the
complexities of the underlying genetic models. Following
that historical line of thought, the subject subsequently
split into two lineages.
On the biological side, Hamilton’s perspective com-
pletely changed the way people approach a great variety
of key problems, ranging from social insects to parasite
virulence to bacterial competition to the evolutionary his-
tory of “individuals” to the historical tendency for an in-
crease in biological complexity. Almost everyone agrees
that this was a revolutionary change in biological thought
and that it derived from Hamilton’s work.
At the same time, heated debates arose about theoret-
ical interpretations and mathematical details. We see in
Hamilton’s 1975 quote the different competing phrases
and associated theoretical perspectives. The ongoing de-
bates have grown ever more fierce rather than settling
out to a common perspective.
Box 3. Literature
For each topic related to kin selection theory, I list a small
sample of key articles and reviews. This limited space does
not allow comprehensive coverage or commentary on the par-
ticular articles, but should provide an entry into the extensive
literature and the range of opinions.
Several reviews follow Hamilton’s perspective [21, 23–30].
An associated literature emphasizes the problem of sociality
and sterile castes in insects, with additional commentary on
general aspects of the theory [31–39].
Kin selection theory has been applied to a wide range
of biological problems. Here, I can list only a few general
overviews. Those overviews give a sense of the scope but do
not include many significant applications [40–47].
The strongest criticisms arose from population genetics.
The main issues concern how the specifics of genetics can vary
from case to case and alter the outcome of selection, and how
the full analysis of dynamics may provide an essential, deeper
perspective on evolutionary process [48–52].
Kin selection theory has a long association with debates
about units and levels of selection. I give a very short listing,
because that topic is beyond my scope [53–56]. The related
topic concerning group selection does fall within my scope
[57–71].
The merging of kin selection theory with quantitative ge-
netics and multivariate analyses of selection follows various
lines of development [72–78]. Advanced aspects of the the-
ory and new directions of theoretical development continue
to appear [79–83].
In essence, I think there is almost no disagreement
about how evolutionary process shapes biological char-
acters. No matter the perspective, when faced with the
same biological problem, all of the different approaches
usually arrive at roughly the same predictions about
how evolution shapes characteristics. Yet, in spite of
that agreement, the arguments persist about whether one
should call the underlying process ‘group selection’ or
‘kin selection’ or ‘inclusive fitness’ or ‘population genet-
ics’ or whatever else is being promoted.
Clearly we need to understand more than just the pre-
dicted outcomes: we must also understand the underly-
ing causal processes. So something is at stake here. But
what exactly? The best way to understand that question
is through the historical development of the subject. So
let us continue with Hamilton’s 1975 article and subse-
quent work.
Almost everything that one would reasonably want to
say about group selection in relation to inclusive fitness
or kin selection is in the following quotes from Hamil-
ton [22]. I quote in full because there has been much
controversy and misunderstanding about these issues. It
helps to read Hamilton’s perspective, given long before
the current participants in the debates fully developed
their views on the subject.
As against ‘group selection’ it [inclusive fit-
ness] provides a useful conceptual tool where
4no grouping is apparent—for example, it can
deal with an ungrouped viscous population
where, owing to restricted migration, an indi-
vidual’s normal neighbours and interactants
tend to be his genetical kindred.
In other words, inclusive fitness is more general. Group
selection is just a case in which the positive association,
r, arises from clearly defined aspects of groups. In cases
for which groups are not easily delineated, the same un-
derlying inclusive fitness approach still holds. Continuing
Because of the way it was first explained,
the approach using inclusive fitness has of-
ten been identified with ‘kin selection’ and
presented strictly as an alternative to ‘group
selection’ as a way of establishing altruistic
social behaviour by natural selection [53, 84].
But the foregoing discussion shows that kin-
ship should be considered just one way of
getting positive regression [r] of genotype in
the recipient, and that it is this positive re-
gression that is vitally necessary for altru-
ism. Thus the inclusive-fitness concept is
more general than ‘kin selection’.
Hamilton preferred to reserve ‘kin selection’ for cases in
which the positive regression, r, comes from interactions
between individuals that we would commonly describe
by terms of kinship, such as cousins. I will later argue
against Hamilton’s use of ‘inclusive fitness’ as the ulti-
mate causal view. I will end up using ‘kin selection’ as
the label for a wide variety of processes, because of the
lack of a better alternative. But in 1975, Hamilton’s view
made sense. For now, it is useful to read what Hamilton
said to understand his perspective on the different fram-
ings for causal process. Continuing
Haldane’s [[7]] suggestion about tribe-
splitting can be seen in one light as a way of
increasing intergroup variance and in another
as a way of getting positive regression in
the population as a whole by having the
groups which happen to have most altruists
divide most frequently. In this case the
altruists are helping true relatives. But in
the assortative-settling model it obviously
makes no difference if altruists settle with
altruists because they are related (perhaps
never having parted from them) or because
they recognize fellow altruists as such, or
settle together because of some pleiotropic
effect of the gene on habitat preference. If we
insist that group selection is different from
kin selection the term should be restricted to
situations of assortation definitely not involv-
ing kin. But it seems on the whole preferable
to retain a more flexible use of terms; to use
group selection where groups are clearly in
evidence and to qualify with mention of ‘kin’
. . ., ‘relatedness’ or ‘low migration’ (which is
often the cause of relatedness in groups), or
else ‘assortation’, as appropriate. The term
‘kin selection’ appeals most where pedigrees
tend to be unbounded and interwoven, as is
so often the case with humans.
The point is that the different labels serve only to help
identify the cause of association, r. The underlying evo-
lutionary process should be understood with respect to
rB−C > 0, even when it is difficult in practice to calcu-
late directly the different terms in Hamilton’s inequality.
Hamilton favored analyzing complex biological problems
with population genetic models, then interpreting those
models in terms of the simple causal framework captured
by the r, B and C components of his rule.
USING HAMILTON’S THEORY TO SOLVE
PROBLEMS
Limitation of Hamilton’s theory in practical
applications
Hamilton [85] used his rule to develop various quali-
tative hypotheses about social insect evolution. When
Hamilton analyzed kin interactions in quantitative mod-
els of sex ratios [86] and dispersal [87], he first made
his mathematical calculations with genetic or game the-
ory models, then made post hoc interpretations of the
quantitative results in terms of interactions between kin.
Hamilton never used inclusive fitness theory or Hamil-
ton’s rule to solve for the quantitative phenotype favored
by selection. Hamilton [22, p. 337] noted that
Although correlation between interactants is
necessary if altruism is to receive positive se-
lection, it may well be that trying to find re-
gression coefficients is not the best analytical
approach to a particular model. Indeed, the
problem of formulating them exactly for sex-
ual models proves difficult (Chapter 2). One
recent model that makes more frequent group
extinction the penalty for selfishness (or lack
of altruism) has achieved rigorous and strik-
ing conclusions without reference to regres-
sion or relatedness [88]. But reassuringly the
conclusions of both this and another similar
model [89] are of the general kind that consid-
eration of regression leads us to expect. The
regression is due to relatedness in these cases,
but classified by approach these were the first
working models of group selection.
In 1979, I took Hamilton’s graduate seminar at the
University of Michigan. I inherited Hamilton’s interest
in fig wasp sex ratios and the idea that one could develop
models of kin interactions and sex ratios using the Price
equation. At that time, Hamilton was losing interest in
5working on such problems, and I was left with the last
seeds of his insight on this subject. As I pursued my
empirical studies of fig wasp sex ratios, I also tried to
learn how one could develop more realistic models of sex
ratios with complex kin interactions.
Using kin selection theory to analyze models of kin
interactions
At first, I had Hamilton’s doubts about using kin se-
lection theory directly to solve problems. Instead, the
method in those days was to solve the problem with pop-
ulation genetics, and then try to interpret the resulting
predictions in terms of kin interactions. The biological in-
teractions from my empirical studies led to horrendously
complex population genetic analyses [90]. With great ef-
fort, I could solve some of the problems. I repeatedly
found that the post hoc interpretations in terms of kin
selection were simple and easy to understand. For ex-
ample, the value to a mother of an extra son is devalued
by the mother’s genetic relatedness to the competitors of
her sons [91–93].
This underlying simplicity in the exact results of popu-
lation genetics led me to try Hamilton’s suggestion about
using the Price equation to model sex ratios. Eventually,
I found a simple Price equation method to get the same
results as the complex genetic approach, when analyzing
commonly used assumptions. The Price equation method
also gave results that were much more general than the
population genetic methods. In a Price equation analy-
sis, it was easy to follow the causal processes during the
derivation, and it was easy to interpret the final results
in terms of the biology. The method was like reading
sentences from a book in which the biological processes
of competition, cooperation, and kin interactions were
written in the clearest and most direct manner.
The generality of my solutions, derived directly in
terms of kin interactions, improved through a series of
papers on sex ratios and dispersal [91–96]. At first, it
did not make sense to twist the results for those biolog-
ical applications into a form that looked like Hamilton’s
rule, rB − C > 0. The results did not appear in terms
of simple costs and benefits. Consequently, I gave little
thought to Hamilton’s rule, and instead thought only of
how kin interactions shaped the evolution of interesting
biological characters.
SOLVING PROBLEMS: DISPERSAL EXAMPLE
A model of dispersal illustrates how the application
of kin selection theory changed through the 1970s and
1980s. In the 1970s, Hamilton [97, 98] became inter-
ested in wing polymorphisms among insects. For exam-
ple, some of the parasitic wasps that live in figs have two
male morphs. A wingless male stays within its natal fig
to compete for nearby mates. A winged male leaves to
search for mates in other figs. Hamilton guessed that
the dispersers must often die before finding another fig
containing potential mates. With such an extreme cost
of dispersal, why would an individual develop to disperse
rather than stay and try to mate locally?
Hamilton and May [87] realized that competition be-
tween kin may explain dispersal even when the cost is
very high. A male that stays and outcompetes brothers
replaces the brother’s sperm with his genetically simi-
lar sperm, causing little gain in the net success of their
shared genotype. By contrast, any success of a male dis-
perser against nonrelated males provides full benefit to
the fitness gain of his genotype.
Although Hamilton and May [87] recognized the kin se-
lection processes involved, they did not use kin selection
theory as a method to analyze the problem. Instead, they
formulated a simple ecological model and then solved for
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). After obtaining
the result, they then gave a post hoc interpretation in
terms of kin interactions.
In 1986, I solved this problem in a much simpler and
more general way by using kin selection theory as a
method of analysis [95]. This history of the kin selection
approach sets the context for the modern understanding
of the theory. The following is a slightly modified sum-
mary from Frank [15, Section 7.2].
Hamilton & May’s ESS model
Hamilton and May [87] assumed that a habitat has a
large number of discrete sites. In each year, the parents
die after producing offspring. Each offspring has a trait
that determines the probability, d, that it disperses from
its natal patch. Those that stay at home, with probabil-
ity 1 − d, compete for one of N available breeding sites.
Dispersers die with probability c, and with probability
1 − c they find a patch in which to compete for breed-
ing. All sites are occupied in the simple model discussed
here. Hamilton & May analyzed the case in which one
breeding site (N = 1) is available in each patch. In an
asexual model, Hamilton & May found the ESS dispersal
fraction, d, to be
d∗ =
1
1 + c
, (2)
in which c, the cost of dispersal, varies from just above
zero on up to nearly one. Interestingly, even if the cost of
dispersal is high and the chance of surviving the dispersal
phase is low, nearly half of the offspring still disperse.
In a second model, Hamilton & May analyzed dispersal
in a sexual species. Sexual reproduction raised analyti-
cal difficulties, because some inbreeding is likely if mating
takes place within the local patch. Their method of anal-
ysis did not easily handle inbreeding, so they assumed
that all males disperse before mating, and a fraction d of
females disperse. With that setup, they found that the
6ESS dispersal fraction for females is
d∗ =
1− 2c
1− 2c2 , (3)
in which the dispersal rate is zero when c ≥ 1/2. Hamil-
ton & May understood the role of kin selection. The
dispersal rate is lower in the sexual compared with the
asexual model because the genetic relatedness of com-
petitors within the natal patch was less in the sexual
model. Less kin competition reduces the benefit of dis-
persing to avoid competition with kin, and so lowers the
dispersal rate favored by selection. Beyond that intu-
itive post hoc interpretation, kin selection theory played
no role in the analysis.
Motro’s population genetic analysis
Motro [99, 100, 101] analyzed a fully dynamic popula-
tion genetic model for the same problem. His complex
analysis, spread over three articles, covered the same bio-
logical assumptions as Hamilton & May, with a few minor
extensions. The length and complexity of Motro’s work
arose from the detailed population genetic analysis, as
opposed Hamilton & May’s relatively simple ESS meth-
ods.
Motro found that, in an asexual model, his result
agreed with Hamilton & May’s expression given in eqn 2.
Motro obtained two additional results. First, in a sexual
model in which the mother controls the dispersal trait of
offspring, the same result arises as for the asexual model,
as in eqn 2. By contrast, when Motro tried to match the
assumptions of Hamilton & May for offspring control of
phenotype, he obtained
d∗ =
1− 4c
1− 4c2 , (4)
which differs from Hamilton & May’s result in eqn 3.
Motro drew two conclusions. First, in sexual models, the
equilibrium depends on whether offspring phenotype is
controlled by the mother or by the offspring. Second,
under offspring control, explicit population genetic mod-
els failed to confirm Hamilton & May’s result. Motro at-
tributed the mismatch to a failure of the simplified ESS
method when compared with his exact and rigorous pop-
ulation genetic techniques.
Analysis by kin selection
I analyzed this dispersal problem by kin selection in
order to understand the different results of Hamilton &
May and Motro [95]. Box 4 shows the expression for
fitness and some technical details.
Following Maynard Smith [102], the standard ESS ap-
proach is to find a local maximum of fitness with respect
to phenotype. When the amount of genetic variation for
the phenotype is small, that local maximum is an ESS.
Box 4. Fitness expression for dispersal
In the dispersal model, fitness w depends on the dispersal
phenotypes at the three different scales: a focal individual,
d; the average dispersal probability in the focal individual’s
patch, dp; and the population average, d¯, yielding
w
(
d, dp, d¯
)
= (1− d)p (dp) + d(1− c)p
(
d¯
)
. (5)
When an individual remains at home, with probability 1− d,
its expected success, p (dp), depends on the average dispersal
fraction in its patch, dp. When an individual disperses, with
probability d, its probability of landing in a new patch is 1−c,
and its expected success in the new patch, p
(
d¯
)
, depends on
the average dispersal probability in the population, d¯. The
expected success expressions, p (dp) and p
(
d¯
)
, can be written
as
p(α) =
1
1− α+ d¯(1− c) ,
in which one can use either α ≡ dp or α ≡ d¯. The denominator
is proportional to the number of competitors for breeding in
a patch, and so the reciprocal is proportional to the expected
success per individual in that patch.
When analyzing the fitness maximum with respect to phe-
notype, one takes the derivative of w in eqn 5 with respect to
d. That differentiation leads to terms in which one has the
derivative of dp with respect d. Such a term would require
specifying how the average phenotype of neighbors in a natal
patch, dp, changes with respect to the phenotype of a focal in-
dividual, d. With kin interactions, that relationship could be
complex, because the focal individual’s phenotype, d, would
be correlated with the average phenotype of its neighbors, dp,
through the genetic similarity among neighbors.
The lack of clarity about the slope of neighbor (or group)
phenotype with respect to the focal individual’s phenotype
initially led to the abandonment of the simple maximization
method for ESS analysis when genetic relatives interacted.
In 1986, when I first analyzed this dispersal problem, I pub-
lished a Price equation method of analysis. I also began to see
that the simple ESS maximization method worked when one
simply replaced the derivative of neighbor phenotype on actor
phenotype by the coefficient of relatedness. One could see the
equivalence by matching up terms in a Price equation analysis
with what one obtained by differentiating fitness with respect
to phenotype and expanding out the terms. However, in the
1980s, I was not certain about how to justify using the simple
maximization approach, so I published only Price equation
analyses. Later, in 1996, with the help of Peter Taylor’s deep
understanding and elegant analysis, we published the general
maximization method [103].
At the time, it was generally thought that this ESS max-
imization method would not work with kin interactions,
and so was not used to analyze problems of kin selection
(Box 4).
I compared my Price equation analysis for the change
7in fitness with the terms obtained by an ESS maximiza-
tion approach. The potentially difficult term in the ESS
analysis is the slope (derivative) of average group phe-
notype with respect to individual phenotype. That slope
from the ESS analysis always matched a regression coeffi-
cient in the Price equation. Under common assumptions,
that regression coefficient is exactly the coefficient of re-
latedness of an individual to its neighbors. Thus, one can
often replace the slope of group phenotype with respect
to individual phenotype by the coefficient of relatedness
from kin selection theory, r (Box 4).
All of that may sound a bit complicated, but in practice
it is quite easy. Take the derivative of fitness with respect
to the individual phenotype; set to r the slope of average
group phenotype with respect to individual phenotype;
and solve for a local maximum to obtain
d∗ =
r − c
r − c2 , (6)
which is the result reported in Frank [95] and discussed
in more detail in Frank [15, Section 7.2].
Kin selection simplifies and generalizes prior results
Motro and Hamilton & May assumed that only one
female could breed in each patch. They made that as-
sumption because their methods did not allow them to
analyze the more complicated situation in which multi-
ple females bred in each patch. To compare eqn 6 to the
prior models, let us first follow that earlier assumption
of one breeding female per patch.
If the organism is asexual, then in each patch the can-
didates for dispersal—the offspring of the single asexual
mother—are related by a coefficient of one, r = 1, and
eqn 6 reduces to Hamilton & May’s result in eqn 2. If the
organism is sexual, and offspring phenotype is controlled
by the mother, then r = 1, and we again have eqn 2.
The reason r = 1 with maternal control is that it is the
relatedness of the individual that controls phenotype to
the average phenotype of its patch that matters. With
only one breeding female, the mother’s phenotype and
the average phenotype in the patch are the same, and
r = 1.
If, by contrast, offspring control their own phenotype,
then relatedness among competitors is r = 1/2, because
competitors on a patch are outbred full siblings. With
r = 1/2 in eqn 6, we recover the second result of Hamilton
& May in eqn 3.
Hamilton & May assumed that the mother mated only
once, so that siblings are related by r = 1/2. By contrast,
Motro implicitly assumed that the mother mated several
times and that offspring in a patch were only half sibs,
so in his model r = 1/4. Using that value of r in the
general solution of eqn 6 yields Motro’s result in eqn 4.
Thus, the single kin selection model of eqn 6 explains
the parent-offspring conflict and the difference between
Motro’s analysis and Hamilton & May’s model.
With the kin selection model, we are not limited to
one breeding site per patch, or to an outbreeding sys-
tem. Rather, we can treat r as a parameter and express
the ESS dispersal fraction in terms of the coefficient of
relatedness. Higher relatedness increases dispersal. The
reason is that a genotype competing with close relatives
gains little by winning locally against its relatives. Even
a small chance of successful migration and competition
against nonrelatives can be favored.
Discussion of the new kin selection methods of
analysis
In retrospect, the kin selection analysis of dispersal
seems simple and obvious. Yet, at the time, Hamilton
had not been able to use kin selection theory to analyze
the problems of sex ratio and dispersal that interested
him. In the theoretical analysis of phenotypes, kin selec-
tion was only a post hoc method of interpreting results
obtained by other means. The understanding of process
was sufficiently confused that Motro could write three
articles criticizing the Hamilton & May model, arguing
that only a formal population genetic analysis could give
the correct results. In fact, Motro simply made differ-
ent assumptions about whether the dispersal phenotype
was controlled by the parent or the offspring and about
whether females mated once or many times. Those dis-
tinctions become obvious from the simpler and more gen-
eral perspective of the kin selection analysis of pheno-
type.
The solution in eqn 6 did not have any obvious con-
nection to Hamilton’s rule. Similar kin selection analyses
of sex ratio models also did not connect in any clear way
to Hamilton’s rule [91–96]. At that time, I had con-
cluded that Hamilton’s rule was not useful for solving re-
alistic problems. In application, nothing like Hamilton’s
rule appeared. It turned out that I was wrong about
the generality of Hamilton’s rule, but it would take an-
other ten years after 1986 to find the hidden connections.
Meanwhile, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, debate
about Hamilton’s rule continued.
PROBLEMS WITH HAMILTON’S RULE BEFORE
1996
Hamilton’s rule became a widely used standard. The
simplicity of rB − C > 0 allowed empiricists to think
through how particular natural histories might influence
the evolution of phenotypes and to formulate testable
hypotheses—the essential attribute for a successful the-
ory. Most biologists continue to abide by some notion
along the lines of Hamilton’s rule, based on its per-
ceived success in explaining empirical patterns (citations
in Box 3).
Yet many theoreticians vigorously attacked the sim-
plicity of Hamilton’s rule. It appeared easy to set up
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who favored the rule replied with ever more sophisticated
theoretical analyses. Anyone with primarily biological
interests, or lacking in years of specialized mathemati-
cal training, gave up following the details. Clearly, the
broader notions of kin selection uniquely explained di-
verse aspects of natural history. Hamilton’s rule seemed
to capture the right idea, if not every possible assumption
that one could conceive.
In this section, I discuss some of the criticisms of
Hamilton’s rule. I focus primarily on issues that arose be-
fore 1996. In that year, my own understanding changed
with the publication of Taylor and Frank [103]. With the
help of Peter Taylor’s elegant insights, I came to see the
proper generalization of Hamilton’s rule. That general-
ization united the simplicity of the original rule with a
new and broader scope. With the broader scope, what
previously seemed like a long list of exceptions to the
rule could be seen as part of an expanded way of framing
problems of social evolution. Later sections discuss the
changes in understanding from 1996. This section sets
the necessary background by focusing on issues before
that time.
Extra terms in Hamilton’s rule
Hamilton’s rule is not sufficient if the direction of
change favored by selection depends on some term in
addition to rB and C. Queller [104] cited several ear-
lier examples in which an extra term is required. He
then showed the general way in which such terms arise.
Suppose that the phenotype, x, is the level of an altruis-
tic behavior that is costly to an individual but beneficial
to its neighbors. Among all the neighbors that interact
within a local patch, the average level of the altruistic
phenotype is xp. Social interactions, through the effects
of these behaviors, increment fitness by
w = Bxp − Cx,
in which C is the cost to the individual for the behavior,
x, and B is the benefit received by the individual from
neighbors that, on average, behave as xp. Putting that
expression into the Price equation, one finds that the al-
truistic behavior increases when rB−C > 0, which illus-
trates Hamilton’s rule. Here, r is the slope (regression)
of xp with respect to x, which measures how strongly an
individual’s behavior is associated with the behavior of
its neighbors.
Following a variety of earlier studies, Queller [104]
pointed out that fitness might depend on synergistic in-
teractions between an individual and its neighbors with
regard to altruistic behaviors. If the benefit only accrues
when both the focal individual and its neighbor act in
concert, then we need to consider a multiplicative term,
y = xxp. One can think of this term as describing the
phenotype of pairs of individuals, in which the pheno-
typic value of the pair depends on how each individual
in the pair behaves. For example, to achieve a task, it
may be that both individuals have to contribute coop-
eratively to that task, otherwise no gain is achieved. In
many cases, one can think of the term y as the average
partnership phenotype of a focal individual paired with
a randomly chosen partner from the group. If we include
this synergistic effect to the increment for fitness we have
w = Bxp − Cx+Dy, (7)
in which D is the fitness contribution of the partnership
phenotype. Putting this expression in the Price equation
yields the condition for the altruistic behavior to increase
as rB − C + ρD > 0. The term ρ is the slope of y with
respect to x, which measures the association between the
individual’s tendency to be altruistic and the tendency of
that individual’s partnerships to behave in concert when
faced with a task that requires joint action.
This analysis suggests that Hamilton’s rule fails when
there are multiplicative interactions between phenotypes,
because factors beyond additive costs and benefits arise
[104]. To anticipate later discussion, note that we may
think of y in eqn 7 as any characteristic other than the
focal individual’s value for the particular behavior under
study, x, and the average of that particular behavior in
neighbors, xp. If ρ is the slope of y on x and ρ 6= 0, then
the analysis will yield a condition for the increase of the
altruistic character x as rB−C+ρD > 0. It does not take
much imagination to think of many different attributes,
y, that could be associated with x and therefore cause
Hamilton’s rule to fail, if one chose to think of the subject
in this way. Before developing that notion, let us continue
with some additional issues.
Ecological context and density dependence
Hamilton [10, 11] emphasized that limited migration
would tend to keep genetically related individuals near
each other. Such population viscosity could favor altru-
ism through the increased relatedness of neighbors. A
popular series of papers in the 1990s raised a problem
with Hamilton’s view of population viscosity [15, 105–
108, Section 7.1].
In a viscous population, neighbors may be related and
therefore candidates for altruism. However, those same
neighbors may also be the primary competitors of a po-
tential altruist. Two potentially offsetting effects may
occur. First, altruism may increase the vigor and success
of a neighbor, which provides a benefit to the actor in
proportion to the relatedness between actor and recipi-
ent. Second, the more vigorous neighbor may take more
of the local resources, which imposes a cost on the orig-
inal altruistic actor. In some cases, the two factors may
cancel each other. If so, altruism cannot evolve in vis-
cous populations, even though neighbors may be closely
related.
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The problem was expressed beautifully in a much ear-
lier article that is rarely cited in this context [23, pp. 353,
376]
Hamilton’s development of the concept of in-
clusive fitness began with the argument that
the reproductive success of an individual or-
ganism cannot be measured by alone consid-
ering the effects on the number and quality of
direct descendants. Also involved are effects
on the reproduction of genetic relatives. But,
since both of these effects can only be mea-
sured in a comparative sense, there are al-
ways other individuals involved, and they are
the reproductive competitors of the individ-
uals and genetic elements being considered.
In Hamilton’s equations they [the competi-
tors] are the population at large, an average of
the rest of the species. Hamilton’s arguments
thus seem only to consider the detriments of
altruism in terms of energy expenditure and
risk-taking in the act itself, and to omit or
at least not specify the problem of subse-
quent detriment to the altruist (or its descen-
dants) owing to the presence of the recipient
(or its descendants). But all of the mem-
bers of the species, or population, will not
compete equally directly with any given in-
dividual. Nearby individuals are more direct
competitors. This would not affect Hamil-
ton’s calculations unless nearby individuals
also have a greater likelihood of being closer
genetic relatives. That such a correlation gen-
erally exists is obvious, and is acknowledged
by Hamilton [85]. I believe this factor mod-
ifies every consideration of whether or not,
and how, nepotism will actually evolve. . . .
The significance of this problem can scarcely
be exemplified better than by a point made
earlier—that if degrees of relatedness and in-
tensity of competition among individuals di-
minish together in certain, not unlikely fash-
ions with distance from any given individual
in a population, then nepotism cannot evolve.
Dispersal and sex ratio
Earlier, I discussed a model of dispersal by Hamilton
and May [87]. In that model, selection favored dispersal
to reduce competition against neighboring relatives and
increase competition against distant, unrelated individu-
als. That process of uncoupling the scales of relatedness
and competition can be understood in light of Alexan-
der’s analysis.
Another line of thought independently developed the
relative scales of altruism, competition, and relatedness.
Clark [109] argued that “Competition between female kin
for local limiting resources may explain a male-biased sec-
ondary sex ratio . . .” To a mother, the benefit of making
an extra daughter is offset by the competitive effect that
extra daughter may have on the mother’s other daugh-
ters. By contrast, sons may disperse before competing
and therefore not reduce the fitness of other sons.
The development of sex ratio theory in the 1980s ac-
counted for the interactions between dispersal, related-
ness, the scale of competition, and the scale of resource
limitation [? ]reviewed in¿frank98foundations. That the-
ory made clear that altruism and kin interactions could
only be understood in the full ecological and demographic
context of the behaviors under study. As Alexander [23]
emphasized, the scales of altruism and relatedness must
be evaluated in relation to the scale of competition.
Ecology and demography in relation to Hamilton’s rule
The terms r, B and C of Hamilton’s rule depend on
the ecological and demographic context. Any consider-
ation of natural history makes that clear. Yet the sub-
ject is full of “discoveries” that Hamilton’s rule fails be-
cause those terms are not constants, and that ecology and
demography matter. The tension arises because simple
population genetic models tend to take costs and bene-
fits as fixed parameters rather than ecologically derived
variables that depend on context.
Similarly, relatedness turns out to be part of a much
broader problem of how to measure costs and benefits
in common units. The traditional view of relatedness
translates gene frequency deviations in an actor with re-
spect to gene frequency deviations in a recipient, putting
all terms on the common scale of consequences for gene
frequency change. That makes sense. However, much
confusion arose because terms that appeared to be equiv-
alent to relatedness often popped up in analyses, yet had
a variety of meanings. As we continue on through the
history and the generalization of Hamilton’s rule, we will
see that Hamilton’s rule can only be understood within
a broader approach of partitioning the causes of fitness
into meaningful components. Before turning to that gen-
eralization, I continue with the criticisms of Hamilton’s
rule that dominated discussion in the 1980s.
FURTHER PROBLEMS: DYNAMICS
It is better to be vaguely right than exactly
wrong [110].
The basic principles of kin selection theory and its de-
scendant ideas always hold. Those principles are: costs
and benefits of phenotypes matter; statistical associa-
tions between actors and recipients of behaviors matter;
and heritability traced from the expression of phenotypes
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to representation among descendants matters. To most
biologists, kin selection theory is understood as a concise
summary of those basic principles.
The story differs in the theoretical literature. Once
one loses sight of the biology, all that is left concerns
mathematical aspects of the theory. Can a particular
approach be used to make an exact calculation about
predicted outcome? If another approach is simpler but
limited in the scope over which it is exactly right, should
it be discarded entirely?
These questions primarily concern mathematical
rather than biological issues. Why should you care about
those questions if you are interested in the biology? You
should care because the theoretical literature has not
done you the favor of sorting out the parts that mat-
ter to you versus the parts that do not. Instead, each
theoretical article seemingly replies to another theoreti-
cal article. The real conceptual progress that does matter
remains buried under the weight of much that does not
really matter to someone interested in biological prob-
lems.
Ultimately, sorting all of this out can only be done
at the technical level. There is no way to argue that
certain technical details do not matter without showing,
technically, why they do not matter. I expressed my
views about the technical issues in my book [15]. Written
15 years ago, that book still gives a good overview of the
issues. Here, I continue to avoid technical discussion, and
simply evoke my perspective on the main points.
Statics versus dynamics
Often in the writings of economists the words
“dynamic” and “static” are used as nothing
more than synonyms for good and bad, re-
alistic and unrealistic, simple and complex.
We damn another man’s theory by terming
it static, and advertise our own by calling it
dynamic. Examples of this are too plentiful
to require citation [111].
It would be helpful to calculate exactly how selection
influences phenotypes. What is the predicted sex ra-
tio under certain patterns of mating and competition?
When will individuals band together to form cooperative
groups? When will groups split apart or fail because of
internal conflict? The generalizations of Hamilton’s rule
and the broader theories of kin selection only provide
exact calculations under certain assumptions [15].
Roughly, the theory becomes exact when the variation
in fitness is small. However, significant amounts of varia-
tion are nearly universal in biology. To use kin selection
as an analytical tool, when can we assume that there is
little variation? Lack of variation primarily arises when
a population approaches an equilibrium. Near an equi-
librium, little further change occurs, and the population
comes nearly to rest—the condition of stasis. Analysis
near an equilibrium is sometimes called ‘statics.’ As an
exact analytical tool, kin selection theory is primarily a
tool for statics.
The problems of statics are widely known. Real bio-
logical systems are unlikely to be near an equilibrium.
Thus, exact analysis must consider dynamics—the full
processes of change. Worse, many problems have dif-
ferent points at which the system could come to rest—
alternative equilibria. If one only analyzes what happens
near an equilibrium, as in statics, one has no idea which
of the alternative equilibria the system will end up near.
Only a full dynamical analysis of change can indicate
which of the equilibria one would expect the system to
evolve toward.
Given all of the benefits of dynamics and the limita-
tions of statics, why would anyone ever consider a theory
based on statics? Because, to make a dynamic analysis,
one has to make a lot of exact and very specific assump-
tions, otherwise one cannot do the analysis. For exam-
ple, one usually has to specify exactly how the genetics
of a phenotype is controlled in order to make a complete
model of population genetics. The problem is that we do
not know the proper assumptions to fill out the required
list for a dynamic analysis. So, in making all of the nec-
essary detailed assumptions for a dynamic analysis, one
is left with an exact calculation that applies exactly to
nothing.
By contrast, the static analysis requires few assump-
tions. In kin selection arguments, usually one needs to
specify how phenotypes and various environmental fac-
tors influence fitness. One obtains a static analysis that
translates the biological assumptions about fitness into
a prediction about how natural selection influences the
evolution of phenotypes. Clearly, this is a vague sort of
analysis, but it is not exactly wrong, as is the full dynam-
ical analysis. Put another way, a static analysis does not
suffer the pretense of exactness. Instead, a static analysis
accepts the limitations and calculates the qualitative pre-
dictions about what one expects to see in various natural
settings.
Comparative statics
Now, an observer fresh from Mars might ex-
cusably think that the human mind, inspired
by experience, would start analysis with the
relatively concrete and then, as more subtle
relations reveal themselves, proceed to the
relatively abstract, that is to say, to start
from dynamic relations and then proceed to
the working out of the static ones. But this
has not been so in any field of scientific en-
deavor whatsoever: always static theory has
historically preceded dynamic theory and the
reasons for this seem to be as obvious as
they are sound—static theory is much sim-
pler to work out; its propositions are easier
11
to prove; and it seems closer to (logical) es-
sentials [112].
A static analysis summarizes the major forces that po-
tentially influence phenotype. However, that sort of sim-
plified theory cannot predict the actual phenotypic value
that one expects to observe. Instead, one should think of
statics in terms of comparison. The dispersal model dis-
cussed earlier provides a good example. In that model,
the predicted dispersal probability from a static kin se-
lection analysis was given in eqn 6, repeated here
d∗ =
r − c
r − c2 ,
in which r is the relatedness between competitors on a
patch, c is the cost of dispersing, and d∗ is the predicted
equilibrium dispersal rate. Certainly, no one believes that
this model will predict the actual dispersal rate in real
cases. Too many factors are left out. Instead, the whole
idea of the analysis is to isolate a few key processes.
The relatedness term, r, raises another problem. In an
actual population, the relatedness in a patch would de-
pend on the dispersal rate. The theory given above does
not tell us how to analyze this dependence between relat-
edness and dispersal. To simplify the analysis, we could
set relatedness, r, as a given parameter. The model then
predicts that as the relatedness among competitors on
a patch increases, the observed dispersal rate increases.
That sort of prediction is the method of comparative stat-
ics.
Comparative statics begins with the assumption that a
dynamic analysis following the joint dependence between
dispersal and relatedness would, ideally, be preferable.
However, one cannot easily achieve that ideal, because
dynamical analysis requires specific assumptions about
a variety of processes for which we do not have informa-
tion. Instead, one admits that one does not know enough
to predict dynamics, and so the analysis should empha-
size statics. A static analysis is based on fewer, simpler
assumptions.
The comparative static analysis isolates key causal pro-
cesses in a direct way. For example, the dispersal model
makes an interesting comparative prediction: as the re-
latedness in a patch increases, the predicted dispersal
rate increases. The ideal empirical test identifies natural
or laboratory settings in which relatedness changes and
one can measure the associated change in the amount of
dispersal. The structure is: measure the change in the
putative cause and the change in the outcome. If the
direction of change in the outcome repeatedly tends to
follow the predicted direction of change, then one is on
to something.
A PRACTICAL METHOD FOR SOLVING
PROBLEMS AND RECOVERY OF HAMILTON’S
RULE
Hamilton did not use kin selection theory to analyze
models of phenotypes. He did pass on to his students
unpublished notes about how the Price equation might
be used to study sex ratios. I obtained those notes in
1979 while attending Hamilton’s graduate seminar. I
modified Hamilton’s Price equation method to solve a
wide variety of problems with kin interactions, includ-
ing the dispersal model that I presented earlier. Hamil-
ton’s class notes are posted as supporting information
for this article in the files WDH notes part1 SuppInfo.pdf
and WDH notes part2 SuppInfo.pdf.
The Price equation method was a bit tedious. Eventu-
ally, I found the match between the standard ESS anal-
ysis of phenotypes and the Price equation analysis of kin
interactions. Earlier, I briefly mentioned the enhanced
ESS approach for kin interactions. This section describes
that enhanced approach in more detail and considers the
broader consequences for understanding the theory.
First steps
The Price equation is a general expression for the
change in average phenotype. To calculate the change
in phenotype, one needs to specify the relation between
phenotype and fitness. For example, Box 4 shows the
relation between dispersal and fitness. When one puts
that expression for fitness into the Price equation, one
obtains a variety of terms. Each term describes the con-
tribution of a component of fitness to the overall change
in phenotype [95].
In a typical problem with kin interactions, different
components of fitness oppose each other. Some favor the
increase in the phenotype, others favor the decrease in
the phenotype. For example, dispersal imposes a direct
cost on an individual, because the increased risk during
dispersal increases the chance of death before reproduc-
tion. By contrast, dispersal benefits the reproduction
of neighbors by reducing the competition experienced by
those neighbors. Together, the various terms in the Price
equation analysis define the different components of fit-
ness.
I found that I could avoid using the Price equation by
directly calculating the value of the phenotype that max-
imized fitness. The maximization approach came from
analyses of ESS phenotypes [102]. The idea is simply
that, at equilibrium with regard to selection, the favored
phenotype must have fitness at least as great as any
slightly different phenotype. If that were not the case,
then the nearby phenotypes with higher fitness would in-
crease, and the previous candidate phenotype was in fact
not an equilibrium with respect to nearby alternatives.
To find a local maximum, one uses the standard calcu-
lus approach. Write a function that relates phenotypes
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to fitness. Take the derivative (change) of fitness with
respect to phenotype. That derivative describes whether
fitness increases or decreases with respect to a change in
phenotype. One assumes that all members of the popu-
lation have the same phenotype, and then analyzes the
fitness change for a small fraction of the population that
has a slightly deviant phenotype. In other words, little
variation exists.
A local maximum can only occur when the fitness nei-
ther increases nor decreases for the deviant phenotype.
If the derivative were increasing, then larger phenotypes
would be favored. If the derivative were decreasing, then
smaller phenotypes would be favored. When the deriva-
tive is zero, then a balance in forces has been achieved,
and no change is favored. When at a balance, one checks
larger phenotypic deviations to make certain that fitness
would indeed decrease if the phenotypic value changed.
If so, then the balance point, where the derivative is zero,
is a local maximum and an ESS. Maximization is just a
mathematical trick for finding an equilibrium. An equi-
librium is a point at which stasis occurs, leading to a
static analysis.
When applying the maximization method, one ends up
with terms that are the change in partner phenotype with
respect to the change in the focal individual’s phenotype.
As I mentioned earlier, that kind of term was initially
thought to be difficult to interpret when kin interactions
occur. When partners are genetically related, then the
association between partner phenotype and focal individ-
ual phenotype depends on the degree of genetic similar-
ity. Early analysts recognized that relatedness matters
[86, 87], but abandoned the method because it was not
clear exactly how genetic similarity would translate into
the relation between partner phenotype and focal indi-
vidual phenotype that arises in the calculus method of
differentiation.
I matched the Price equation terms to the ESS maxi-
mization method. I could see that the difficult term for
the change in partner phenotype with respect to individ-
ual phenotype was like the regression term that Hamilton
[2] had come to use as the coefficient of relatedness in his
theory. That equivalence meant that one could use the
much simpler maximization trick and the power of cal-
culus to analyze fitness and find ESS phenotypes. One
just had to replace the change in partner phenotype with
respect to focal individual phenotype by the coefficient
of relatedness between them.
Before 1995, I only published Price equation analy-
ses. That method, although a bit tedious, easily gave
solutions to many problems of dispersal, sex ratio, and
tragedy of the commons models for sociality. I published
a series of articles between 1985 and 1994 on those top-
ics, as summarized in Frank [15]. I did not publish the
maximization method without use of the Price equation,
because the Price equation had a prior history in the liter-
ature and seemed like a more defensible approach. How-
ever, in Frank [113], I analyzed a more complex problem,
for which avoiding the Price equation and using only the
calculus method provided important advantages in un-
derstanding the evolution of phenotypes in social inter-
actions. Thus, I needed to develop the calculus approach
into a publishable form.
Generalized Hamilton’s rule as a marginal value
expression
To develop the calculus method, I approached Peter
Taylor in 1995. Taylor found a way to connect the
calculus method to Hamilton’s rule. I had abandoned
Hamilton’s rule, because nothing like Hamilton’s rule
had appeared in my numerous studies of different pheno-
types. Suddenly, all of my prior analyses could be under-
stood more deeply by their connection to the generalized
Hamilton’s rule that came from our work [103].
The calculus method automatically separates out the
various causes of fitness into the three aspects of Hamil-
ton’s rule. First, all of the focal individual’s phenotypic
effects on its own fitness combine into one term. In the
calculus analysis, that term is the small change in direct
fitness for a given small change in the focal individual’s
phenotype, holding constant the phenotype of other in-
dividuals.
The small changes are usually described as ‘marginal
changes,’ matching the classical usage of marginal values
in economic analysis. The first term is thus the marginal
effect of an individual’s phenotype on its own fitness,
holding constant all other effects. This marginal effect
matches exactly the cost term in Hamilton’s rule. One
traditionally defines this effect as a cost in such models,
because in the standard case of altruism, one analyzes
a phenotype that directly lowers the actor’s fitness—the
cost. Mathematically, there is no need for this direct
effect to be negative and costly, and in some models it is
not. But we retain the traditional usage and label this
term ‘the cost.’ Because the calculus approach analyzes
small changes, that method automatically gives us the
marginal cost.
The second component is the marginal effect of small
changes in an individual’s phenotype on the fitness of
social partners. Traditionally, the effect of the actor on
recipients is called the ‘benefit.’ Thus, this second effect
is the marginal benefit component.
The third component measures the association be-
tween the actor’s phenotype and the phenotype or geno-
type of social partners. The exact measure depends on
various issues [15]. Here, simply note that the calcu-
lus approach automatically weights any marginal benefit
components by the association between the actor and
recipient. That association matches the coefficient of re-
latedness from Hamilton’s rule, although in a generalized
form.
An equilibrium can occur only when selection does not
favor a change in phenotype. Thus, at equilibrium, the
marginal Hamilton’s rule equals zero and has the form
rBm − Cm = 0, (8)
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in which I use the m subscripts to emphasize that the
benefit and cost terms are marginal values [103]. The
marginal values will change with changing phenotypic
values and with changing ecological and demographic
context. Thus, this analysis makes clear that Hamil-
ton’s rule arises from context-dependent benefit and cost
terms. Others had noted the context dependence of those
terms [21, 64, 73]. But Taylor and Frank [103] was the
first approach that easily found the ESS phenotype and
at the same time showed the underlying conceptual ba-
sis by expressing a generalized Hamilton’s rule. I use
the term ‘generalized’ because the analysis extended the
kinds and complexity of social interaction that could be
studied and the interpretation of relatedness. It also be-
came clear how to deal with multiple social processes si-
multaneously, leading to multiple marginal cost and ben-
efit terms.
The Taylor & Frank method leaves out much mathe-
matical detail. That simplicity allows one to start with
an expression for how different phenotypes and other fac-
tors influence fitness, take a standard type of derivative
from calculus, and evaluate an equilibrium ESS outcome
favored by selection. This method of analysis automati-
cally gives the form for the equilibrium ESS condition as
the marginal Hamilton’s rule in eqn 8. The ESS provides
the basis for comparative statics, in which one can see
clearly how the the predicted phenotype changes with
respect to various social, ecological and demographic
causes.
To achieve that simplicity, one ignores dynamics, cer-
tain details of genetics, and the developmental complex-
ities that connect genotype to phenotype. Most of those
complications do not alter the mathematical results with
respect to searching for equilibrium values. That magi-
cal simplification arises because, whenever the amount of
variation in the population is small, most of the complex-
ities become negligible in size, and the method correctly
identifies the outcome of selection. Although it is pos-
sible to include additional complexity, the method sim-
plifies by design, following the precepts of comparative
statics.
Marginal Hamilton’s rule analysis of dispersal
The marginal Hamilton’s rule in eqn 8 evaluates a
problem by the marginal costs and benefits of a pheno-
type. Consider the dispersal model of Hamilton and May
[87] described earlier. If we start with the fitness expres-
sion in Box 4, take the derivative of fitness with respect
to the variant phenotype of a focal individual, and collect
together the terms, we end up with the cost, benefit, and
relatedness components of the marginal Hamilton’s rule
[15, Section 7.2].
Following that method
Cm =
c
1− cd , (9)
in which the marginal cost of increased dispersal, Cm, is
the cost of dispersal, c, divided by the level of competition
on a patch for a breeding spot, 1 − cd (Box 5). The
marginal benefit is
Box 5. Analysis of dispersal model
For the marginal cost in eqn 9, we obtain the competition term
in the denominator by counting the number of individuals on
a patch competing for each breeding slot. That number is
proportional to the fraction of individuals that do not disperse
and stay at home to compete, 1 − d, plus the fraction of
individuals that disperse and become immigrants into each
patch. The immigrant fraction is the fraction that disperse, d,
multiplied by the probability of surviving the dispersal phase,
1− c. Putting the pieces together for the denominator, which
is an expression proportional to the number of competitors
on a patch, we obtain 1− d+ d(1− c) = 1− cd.
For the marginal benefit in eqn 10, the denominator mea-
sures the intensity of competition between pairs of individuals
in the patch for a given level of dispersal and cost of dispersal.
Roughly speaking, intensity of competition can be measured
by the probability that two individuals will compete for the
same breeding spot. From the previous paragraph, the in-
tensity of competition for a breeding spot is proportional to
1 − cd. Thus, the pairwise competition for a spot is propor-
tional to (1− cd)2.
Bm =
1− d
(1− cd)2 , (10)
in which the numerator, 1 − d, describes how increased
dispersal reduces the competition experienced by neigh-
bors. The denominator adjusts the benefit of reduced
competition by the intensity of competition between pairs
of individuals for each breeding spot, (1 − cd)2 (Box 5).
Putting these terms in the marginal Hamilton’s rule of
eqn 8 leads to the general solution for dispersal in eqn 6.
The marginal cost and benefit expressions are essen-
tially impossible to obtain either intuitively, by think-
ing about the dispersal problem, or by inspecting the
mathematical expression for fitness given in Box 4. It is
only with the maximization technique that the separate
marginal cost and benefit expressions can be found.
Once one has the marginal expressions, one can study
them to learn how the simple biological assumptions
translate into cost and benefit effects on different com-
ponents of fitness. As the phenotype of interest changes,
the costs and benefits change through complex social,
demographic and ecological interactions. There will es-
sentially never be fixed costs and benefits that can be
plugged into some equation. Instead, one must extract
those costs and benefits from the biological assumptions
and the analysis of the problem.
Historically, people have tended to take Hamilton’s
rule as an expression based on fixed costs and bene-
fits. That history arose because of the population genetic
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modeling that was associated with the early evaluation of
the theory. In a population genetic model, the tendency
has always been to set costs and benefits as parameters
associated with different genotypes. Frequency and den-
sity dependence, and other biological interactions, were
considered to be distinct from the costs and and benefits,
as if those costs and benefits were not an outcome of the
biology. That approach misled people to think of Hamil-
ton’s rule as an expression that translated fixed costs and
benefits into a conclusion about evolutionary change.
The Taylor and Frank [103] method helps because it
gives a way to translate biological assumptions about
phenotypes and fitness into the separate marginal cost
and benefit terms needed to evaluate Hamilton’s rule.
One must keep in mind that Hamilton’s rule is, in prac-
tice, an expression that derives particular meaning from
context. Without context, the marginal cost and bene-
fit terms are abstract. That abstraction is the primary
strength of Hamilton’s rule, allowing it to apply univer-
sally. At the same time, abstraction often causes confu-
sion, because the power of abstraction requires a certain
degree of consideration to understand and apply properly
[17].
TAYLOR’S INSIGHT INTO REPRODUCTIVE
VALUE, DEMOGRAPHY AND LIFE HISTORY
In the recent literature, the methods of Taylor and
Frank [103] are primarily used to analyze specific models
by the marginal version of Hamilton’s rule (eqn 8). As
long as one accepts the approach of comparative statics,
generating testable hypotheses follows a simple proce-
dure. First, express the different phenotypes and ecologi-
cal factors that affect fitness in an equation that describes
the natural history assumptions. Second, maximize the
fitness expression to obtain the predictions of compara-
tive statics.
That mathematical method solves what had previ-
ously been complex and often beyond analysis. It also
provided a conceptual advance by developing my ear-
lier Price equation and maximization approaches into
the marginal Hamilton’s rule expression in eqn 8. The
marginal Hamilton’s rule clarified understanding about
how selection works and how to interpret a wide variety
of problems in natural history [15].
The importance of reproductive value
From my point of view, however, the great advance in
Taylor and Frank [103] came from Peter Taylor’s insight
about reproductive value in models of kin selection. Re-
productive value concerns the relative contribution of an
individual to the future of the population. For example,
older individuals may have a lower expectation of future
reproduction before death than do younger individuals.
The benefit of altruism provided to an older individual
must be discounted by the low expected reproductive
value of old age when compared with the greater repro-
ductive value associated with altruistic benefits given to
a younger individual.
The problem of reproductive value had always been a
part of kin selection theory. Hamilton [85] clearly noted
that different individuals in a social interaction may con-
tribute differently to the future of the population. In
Hamilton’s analysis, when calculating the benefit of al-
truism toward different individuals, one must weight each
individual by its genetic relatedness to the actor and by
its relative reproductive value. For example, helping a
young cousin in the prime of life provides greater net
benefit than the same help given to a much older sibling
near the end of life. Relatedness alone is not sufficient.
Prior status of the theory
Although the importance of reproductive value was un-
derstood, the theory was in an odd state before 1996. The
general approach used by Hamilton and most followers
was simply to attach a reproductive value weighting to
each component of fitness. If an actor and recipient had
different reproductive values, then an extended Hamil-
ton’s rule might be rBvr − Cva > 0, in which vr and va
are the reproductive value weightings for recipient and
actor. If, for example, the recipient is a young individual
near prime reproductive age, and the actor is an old in-
dividual near the end of life, then vr is much larger than
va, and the old individual may be favored to express a
costly altruistic act toward the young individual even if
the recipient is only distantly related to the actor.
Simply attaching reproductive value terms to fitness
components is correct but often not helpful. It is not
helpful, because it provides no guidance about how to
find the right valuations in realistic problems.
Separately, a complete theory of life history had devel-
oped [114]. That theory provided clear guidelines for how
to compare different classes of individuals and different
components of fitness with respect to their reproductive
values. The relative reproductive value weightings pre-
dict how life history characters, such as relative invest-
ment in reproduction and survival, may change with age,
condition, local ecological factors, and the demographic
structure of the population. That well developed theory
of life history had many successes in explaining major
aspects of organismal physiology and behavior.
Actual problems of natural history often required com-
bining the relative reproductive valuations with the role
of kin interactions. However, connecting life history
theory to kin selection analysis had not been achieved
in a generally useful way. When studying the the-
ory of such problems, one could come up with vari-
ous special approaches or complicated analyses [? ]e.g.,
¿frank87demography. However, if one cannot apply a
theory in a clear and simple way, one does not truly un-
derstand the theory at a deep level. In this case, the basic
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issue was combining reproductive value with the various
aspects of phenotypic evolution that arose in social set-
tings. But it was not known how to do that in an easy
way.
Combining kin selection and life history
Peter Taylor saw all of that. He figured out how to
attach our general kin selection approach with life his-
tory analysis. The extended method accounted for the
full context of ecological and demographic factors that
interact with social phenotypes [103]. The method easily
translates natural history into analysis. As before, one
specified a problem by how phenotypes affect fitness. In
addition, one now also specified the different classes of
individuals involved and the distinct components of fit-
ness. For example, there could be older individuals and
younger individuals. The age groups would be embedded
in the demographic structure of birth and death rates,
which could depend on the social phenotypes. Each class
could be either actor or recipient or both, in the sense
that the phenotype of interest could be expressed by dif-
ferent kinds of individuals and could affect different kinds
of individuals. Many realistic problems of sociality have
this sort of class structure.
All of this may sound complicated. But the beauty of
Taylor’s insight is that the crude maximization method
that I had been using was transformed into a simple
method that combined analysis of sociality, generalized
notions of kin relations through correlations between phe-
notypes, and the full power of life history analysis.
Opportunity for synthesis
Up to 1996, I had relatively little interest in theories
of kin selection, inclusive fitness, and group selection as
separate subjects worthy of study. Instead, I had thought
of those theories as tools that one used to solve problems
of natural history, in the sense of comparative statics.
I had developed those solutions into testable hypothe-
ses about interesting phenotypes. My collaboration with
Peter Taylor opened my eyes to the deep problems of
selection that had been latent in the subject.
In particular, our new approach brought out the proper
formulations for marginal valuation and reproductive val-
uation. Of course, that was, in a sense, not new, because
Hamilton had all the right ideas. But, just as Hamilton
could not use kin selection theory to solve the problems
that most interested him, such as dispersal and sex ra-
tio, he also could not use life history and reproductive
value to solve problems of sociality embedded in the nat-
ural complexities of demography and multiple classes of
social interactants.
I had always believed that if one could not use a theory
to solve problems, then one had only a superficial un-
derstanding of deeper concepts. With Taylor and Frank
[103], I suddenly realized the deep connections between
the understanding of marginal valuation and reproduc-
tive valuation in sociality and the solving of actual prob-
lems of natural history. That new perspective caused me
to take up the study of the general theory. I wanted to
evaluate the status of the deeper principles in relation to
the way in which one analyzed problems.
Unresolved issues
I soon found that Taylor and Frank [103] led to many
key points that remained vague or unresolved. Two is-
sues stood out. First, the meaning of the relatedness
coefficient seemed to be confused. Variations in interpre-
tation arose for different kinds of problems. The original
simplicity of Hamilton’s genetic kinship theory had fi-
nally sunk. There were many earlier hints of problems,
but with the expanded scope of the theory, the contra-
dictions became too numerous to ignore.
The second issue concerned the connections between
the models of phenotype in sociality and the developing
theories of multivariate selection in quantitative genetics.
Those theories of multivariate selection had advanced
greatly since the classic article by Lande and Arnold
[115]. Following Lande & Arnold, many studies consid-
ered how to partition the causes of selection among the
different characters that affected fitness and how to ana-
lyze expanded notions of heritability. Those advances in
quantitative genetics seemed to be closely related to the
problems of analyzing social evolution. Some steps had
been made to connect those advances to sociality, yet the
deeper relations remained unclear.
Following up on what I learned by working with Pe-
ter Taylor, I set out to understand those two issues: the
generalization of relatedness and the causal analysis of
fitness and heritability. I eventually came across a sur-
prising number of problems that I had never understood
or had not even realized that I was ignoring in my many
prior analyses of kin interactions.
QUELLER’S INSIGHT AND THE TRUE
MEANING OF HAMILTON’S RULE
In pursuit of unresolved issues, I soon came to the
key articles by Queller [64, 73]. Queller developed the
idea that Hamilton’s analysis had always been about the
causal interpretation of fitness components. Hamilton
separated the total fitness effect of a social act into costs,
benefits, and relatedness so that one could reason more
clearly about how selection shaped behaviors. Hamilton
never presented the theory as an alternative to classical
methods. Instead, he was after causal decomposition.
Much of the literature through the 1980s lost sight of
this primary emphasis on causal decomposition. Con-
troversies about population genetics versus kin selection
were ultimately about the tension between dynamics and
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comparative statics. Full dynamical analyses with de-
tailed assumptions about genetics provide exact theories
that perhaps apply to no real cases. Statics applies ap-
proximately to all situations, but perhaps not exactly to
any particular case.
In my own comparative statics analyses of dispersal,
sex ratios, and various social traits, I focused on the
solutions for phenotypes in terms of biological assump-
tions. I did not try to analyze the problems with respect
to the sort of causal decomposition into costs and ben-
efits that Hamilton had emphasized. Later I came to
understand the power of the marginal Hamilton’s rule.
I then began to understand my past comparative stat-
ics models in terms of Hamilton’s partition into causal
components. In particular, the marginal Hamilton’s rule
automatically separated fitness components into direct
effects (costs) and indirect effects (benefits) weighted by
relatedness [103].
Queller [64, 73] had also derived an expression similar
to the marginal Hamilton’s rule. Queller first partitioned
fitness into components according to a regression model.
His regression terms included the phenotype of the actor
and the phenotype of the recipient—or the genotypes de-
pending on the analysis. Queller considered the different
phenotypes within the general context of quantitative ge-
netic analyses of multivariate selection [115]. That con-
nection to multivariate quantitative genetics eventually
opened the way to a broader interpretation of the com-
ponents of fitness and the components of heritability.
Queller put his multivariate regression expression for
fitness into the Price equation to obtain a multiple regres-
sion form of Hamilton’s rule. One term is the effect of an
actor’s phenotype on its own fitness, holding constant the
phenotype of its neighbors (cost). The other term is the
effect of the neighbors’ phenotype on the actor’s fitness,
holding constant the actor’s phenotype (benefit). These
cost and benefit terms arise as partial regression coeffi-
cients in the partitioning of fitness into components. In
the Price equation, one automatically obtains a weighting
of the benefit term by the regression of neighbor pheno-
type on actor phenotype (or genotype). That weighting
provides a measure of relatedness. Thus, the condition
for the increase of an altruistic behavior is rB − C > 0,
where each term directly corresponds to a regression co-
efficient.
Queller’s partial regression terms for cost and benefit
are similar to the cost and benefit terms of the marginal
Hamilton’s rule. However, two differences are important.
First, Queller’s approach emphasizes the causal analy-
sis of components. He explicitly related the regression
model of fitness to a path analysis model, which high-
lights a causal interpretation of the different terms in the
regression.
Second, the regression terms, although more general
and potentially interpreted by causal analysis, provide a
poor method for analysis of actual problems in terms of
comparative statics. Even simple models of dispersal and
sex ratio lead to complex and essentially uninterpretable
regression expressions. That complexity led me to aban-
don the direct use of such regressions in my earlier Price
equation models and instead to develop the maximiza-
tion technique. The maximization technique requires the
additional assumption of limited variation. In return for
that assumption, one obtains a simple and powerful com-
parative statics tool. In practice, one trades the concep-
tually powerful regression modeling and causal analysis
for the analytically powerful maximization method and
comparative statics.
Once I had the first formal expression of the maxi-
mization technique from Taylor and Frank [103], I eval-
uated the advantages and disadvantages of the various
approaches. I could see that one had to unite Queller’s
causal approach through regression and path analy-
sis with the analytical power of the maximization and
marginal value techniques. Causal analysis ties back to
Hamilton’s original goal of separating fitness and trans-
mission into components in order to reason more clearly
about how selection and genetics shape social traits.
Marginal values and comparative statics are also neces-
sary, to provide the tools to analyze actual problems. Put
another way, causal analysis provides the foundations for
reasoning about complex problems, and marginal value
analysis provides the techniques for applying that rea-
soning to particular cases.
Taylor and Frank [103] came close to uniting the
quantitative genetic and causal models given by Queller
[64, 73] with the calculus techniques for comparative stat-
ics. However, once that loose connection was made, I
soon began to see the next level of unsolved problems. In
essence, the overly simple notions of an actor and a re-
cipient and of a cost and benefit were too limiting. Those
restrictive assumptions limited general understanding of
causes and the analysis of particular cases. To move
ahead, one had to think through various types of nat-
ural history and to work out how to separate the many
causes into distinct components. That causal decomposi-
tion was Hamilton’s original goal. But one no longer had
to be confined to the oversimplified abstractions in which
Hamilton originally worked to show how causal decom-
position might be done. Instead, the time had come for
a more general approach.
The class structured modeling for social interactions
introduced in Taylor and Frank [103] suggested the next
steps. Taylor & Frank gave examples with multiple
classes in social interactions. Those sorts of multiclass
problems lead to more general causal decompositions
with multiple actors and recipients and, more generally,
with a broader way to reason about the causal compo-
nents of realistic problems. Those multiclass problems
also brought out the challenge of tracing the distinct
pathways of transmission and heritability that determine
what fraction of the change by selection transmits to the
future population.
The way forward was to work carefully with causal
decompositions of fitness and the transmission of char-
acters, to use the Price equation as a formal tool to
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keep track of everything in an exact evolutionary anal-
ysis, and then to simplify as needed to obtain practical
tools for comparative statics. Although that may sound
complicated, it turns out to be a natural extension of
rB − C > 0. One simply needs additional causal terms
to match realistic problems, and to interpret the various
terms more broadly than Hamilton did.
THE PROPER GENERALIZATION OF KIN
SELECTION THEORY
Hamilton’s theory is ultimately about causal interpre-
tation. The proper generalization arises from a clearer
understanding of causal decomposition. With regard to
the causal analysis of relatedness, Hamilton [2, 22] had
already given up on the limited interpretation of the the-
ory with regard to pedigree relations and classic notions
of kinship. Instead, he realized that the theory could be
extended to deal with genetic similarities no matter how
those similarities arise. Causally, selection must be in-
different to the process that generates genetic similarity.
Selection can only act on the current patterns of genetic
variation and the current processes that influence fitness.
Subsequent generalizations continued to refine the
causal interpretation of selection. The theory naturally
transformed from its initial emphasis on identity by de-
scent and lineal kin relations to statistical associations
of genotypes and then to broader aspects of correlated
characters in social interactions.
An example: interspecific altruism
My study of altruism between species taught me that
kin selection must be thought of as part of a wider set of
problems [116]. I had asked the typical altruism question:
when is an individual favored to help another at a cost
to itself? In this case, the problem concerned whether an
individual of one species could be favored to help an in-
dividual of another species. Clearly, the traditional view
of genetic kinship could not be involved. Members of dif-
ferent species that do not interbreed cannot be cousins
or other types of related kin.
I set up the interaction between species as a variant
of Hamilton’s standard model. In this case, I evaluated
whether altruistic behavior by one species toward a sec-
ond species can increase by selection.
Individuals of the first species have phenotype x, the
level of help they provide to individuals of the other
species. The altruistic phenotype directly reduces the fit-
ness of actors from the first species by Cx. Individuals of
the other species have phenotype y, the level of help they
provide to individuals of the first species. That altruis-
tic phenotype of the second species directly enhances the
fitness of recipients of the first species by By. The goal is
to evaluate how these behavioral interactions determine
the direction of change in the altruistic phenotype x of
the first species.
The first species cannot accrue inclusive fitness benefits
by helping the second species. An inclusive fitness ben-
efit is the indirect transmission of the actor’s genotype
through the recipient of the actor’s altruistic behavior.
Members of another species cannot carry genotypic dif-
ferences that influence the evolution of traits in the focal
species. Inclusive fitness has no meaning in relation to
altruism between species. Nonetheless, we end up with
Hamilton’s rule, as follows.
Focus on an individual in the first species with altru-
istic phenotype, x. That altruism reduces fitness by Cx.
The focal individual may receive benefits from the al-
truism of the other species. Suppose that the particular
social partners from the other species for the focal indi-
vidual have phenotype y, which adds By to the fitness of
the focal individual. The combination of gains and losses
for these effects causes an increase in fitness to the focal
individual when
By − Cx > 0.
Now comes the key step: the association between the al-
truistic behaviors of partners from the two species. Sup-
pose the slope (regression) of y relative to x is r. Then,
in evaluating fitness changes, we can use y = rx, because
the altruistic level of the focal individual, x, predicts the
associated value of y. The translation between x and y
is the regression coefficient, r.
Using y = rx, the fitness change is positive when
Brx− Cx > 0,
which is the same as
rB − C > 0.
Is that Hamilton’s rule? If one abides by inclusive fit-
ness and the traditional view established by Hamilton,
then the answer is no. If one recognizes that the tra-
ditional view came into being before we understood the
broader analysis of characters and the general role of cor-
relations, then the answer is maybe. In the latter case,
we must figure out the broader context and its relations
to traditional models of social evolution, and then make a
decision about how to understand the full range of social
characters.
After Taylor and Frank [103], I followed up by trying
to apply the new theory to various problems of natu-
ral history. Several conceptual limitations became clear.
The most important problem concerned the meaning of
relatedness. A second associated issue concerned the in-
terpretation of inclusive fitness. The remainder of this
section discusses relatedness. The following section takes
up inclusive fitness.
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Two types of relatedness: social partners and
transmission
Queller’s [64, 73] quantitative genetic approach linked
kin selection to Lande & Arnold’s [115] general analysis
of multivariate selection. In the traditional multivariate
approach, one usually thinks of two different phenotypes
as traits present in each individual. That same concep-
tual approach to multivariate analysis can also evaluate
social situations, in which one phenotype is present in one
type of individual, and the other phenotype is present in
the social partners of the first type [14].
The two interacting types of individuals may be play-
ers in a game, members of different species, members of
a family, or any other combination. For any of those in-
teractions, we can often evaluate the consequences in the
same way that I described for the interaction between
two different species. The focal individual has a pheno-
type with direct cost Cx. That focal individual also has
social partners that influence the focal individual’s fit-
ness by a factor By, where y is the average phenotype of
the social partners. These two phenotypes, x and y, lead
to a multivariate analysis of selection that depends on
the correlation between characters. In this case, the two
characters happen to be in different individuals. But the
analysis is essentially the same as a standard multivariate
selection problem.
The correlation between the focal individual’s pheno-
type, x, and its partners’ phenotype, y, is best expressed
as a regression coefficient r of y on x. If partners are
genetic kin, the r will be a kind of genetic kinship co-
efficient. If the partners are genetically similar but not
by traditional lines of kinship, the r is still similar to the
form of the relatedness coefficient that Hamilton [2] in-
troduced as the key to his theory, which did not depend
on traditional kinship ties.
The partners may have correlated phenotypes, but be
genetically uncorrelated. If so, our focal individual still
gains by the beneficial social phenotype of its partners.
The magnitude of that gain is in proportion to the same
regression coefficient, r, in which the association is purely
phenotypic. But we must separate two aspects: selection
and transmission. That separation forms a standard part
of multivariate quantitative genetics. Selection is the dif-
ferential success within a period, such as a behavioral
episode or a generation. Transmission is the fidelity by
which selected traits are transmitted to the future, the
heritability.
In this model, we can think of two distinct classes of
individuals. The focal individual is both an actor and a
recipient for its own phenotype, x. It is an actor because
it expresses the phenotype; it is a recipient because its
success is influenced by the same phenotype, x. The part-
ners are actors, because they express the phenotype, y.
But they are not recipients, because we have not specified
that either trait, x or y, affects the partners’ own success.
The focal individual is a recipient of the phenotype, y.
The total fitness increment on the focal individual with
respect to the phenotype, x, is proportional to rB − C,
as shown in the previous section. Evolutionary change
depends on the heritability of the phenotype, x. This fol-
lows the typical combination in genetics: selection deter-
mines relative reproduction, and heritability determines
the fraction of selective change that is transmitted to the
future.
The heritability is not particularly important in this
case. Suppose, for example, that the heritability is τ =
Rh. Here, R is the genetic kinship between the focal
individual and its descendants, and h is the fraction of the
phenotypic variability attributed to genes. In a typical
parent-offspring example, R = 1/2. If we compared an
individual to a niece through a full sibling, then typically
R = 1/4. The condition for x to increase must include
the heritability. Thus, the condition is
(rB − C) τ > 0,
which describes the transmitted fraction, τ = Rh, of the
selective gain, rB − C. If the trait is heritable, τ > 0,
then this condition is the same as rB − C > 0. Here,
distinguishing the similarity between social partners, r,
and transmission in proportion to R, did not change the
result.
Distinguishing the types of relatedness
In many cases, one must distinguish the role of social
partners from the role of transmission. Consider the fol-
lowing example [14, Fig. 9]. There are two classes of
individuals. Individuals of the active class express an al-
truistic phenotype, x, with cost C. A focal individual of
the active class has social partners from the active class
that express an average level of altruism, y, with benefit
B to the focal individual. The fitness increment for a
focal individual in this active class with respect to the
altruistic behaviors is w1 = By − Cx.
Each individual from the active class also has a sin-
gle partner from a second, inactive class. Members of
that second class do not express an altruistic phenotype.
They may, for example, be relatives that receive care but
do not give care. The inactive partner gains a benefit, Bˆ,
from its active partner’s altruism, x, so its fitness incre-
ment from altruism is w2 = Bˆx. To simplify, we ignore
the potentially different reproductive values of the two
classes. An inactive partner might, for example, be an
offspring or a nondescendant kin.
From the previous section, the direct fitness effect on
class one is rB − C, where r is the regression of y on x.
If the phenotypic association between an actor and its
social partners, r, arises from genetic similarity, then r is
a classic kin selection coefficient of relatedness. However,
nothing in the model requires genetic similarity. Here, r
only has to do with phenotypic similarity, because rB−C
is the fitness effect separated from aspects of transmission
to the future.
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The class one individuals transmit their phenotypes to
the future in proportion to τ1, the heritability of their
altruistic trait. Thus, the total direct transmitted com-
ponent by class one is proportional to (rB−C)τ1, which
matches the result of the prior section.
In this case, we also have the beneficial effect, Bˆ, of the
class one individuals on their inactive partners from class
two. The benefit, Bˆ, describes the fitness effect separate
from aspects of transmission to the future. For exam-
ple, if the class two individuals are genetically unrelated
to their actor partners, then the enhanced fitness of the
class two individuals has no effect on the evolution of al-
truism, because those class two recipients are genetically
unrelated to the actors.
In general, we may specify the heritability of a class one
actor’s phenotype, x, through its beneficial effect on its
class two partner, as τ2. For example, the class two part-
ner may produce nieces and nephews of the actor, and
τ2 would be the relatedness of the actor to its nieces and
nephews. But the more general interpretation is impor-
tant: τ2 is the heritability, or transmitted information,
of the class one phenotype through its beneficial fitness
effect on its partner of class two. The net direct effect of
selection and transmission on class two is Bˆτ2.
Combining the class one and class two effects, the total
transmitted consequence of the actor’s phenotype favors
an increase in altruism when
(rB − C)τ1 + Bˆτ2 > 0. (11)
This expression combines the role of correlated pheno-
types between social partners, r, and the pathways for
the fidelity of transmission to the future, τ .
This example illustrates how to combine the two dif-
ferent aspects of similarity, or relatedness, that arise in
models of social evolution. The general approach requires
separating classes of individuals according to their role in
the social process, following the direct fitness effects on
each class, weighting each class by the fidelity of trans-
mission of the phenotype under study, and also weighting
each class by its reproductive value [13–15]. In practice,
one typically uses the maximization technique of Taylor
and Frank [103], as updated in Frank [13, 15].
All of this follows the kind of causal decomposition at
the heart of Hamilton’s approach to kin selection theory.
But one has to accept several generalizations to the the-
ory, otherwise the problem is beyond understanding by
kin selection analysis. In particular, one must separate
the correlation between phenotypes that influences fit-
ness from the correlation between an actor and various
descendants that determines heritability.
The original theories of kin selection and inclusive fit-
ness blurred the distinction between these different kinds
of correlation. To understand the issues more broadly,
one must accept a theory that follows different causes
of fitness, including correlations between social partners,
and different causes of transmission, including direct and
indirect pathways by which phenotypes pass to future
generations [13–15].
Kin selection versus correlated selection
I have emphasized a causal analysis of selection rather
than a purely kinship analysis of selection. In the broader
causal perspective, the two key factors are transmission
and selection. Transmission of social characters always
depends on aspects of shared genotype, or at least on
shared heritable traits. For selection, correlated social
phenotypes play the key role. Such correlations may arise
by kinship, by shared genotype through processes other
than kinship, or by associations through processes other
than shared genotype.
With regard to correlated social phenotypes, it may
seem tempting to define the genetic associations as the
proper limited domain for kin selection theory. Hamilton
developed his theory by first analyzing classical pedigree
kinship. He then broadened his scope to include shared
genotype through processes other than kinship. But he
did not expand his theory to the general analysis of cor-
related traits by processes other than shared genotype.
There can never be a final resolution with regard to
the proper domain for kin selection theory. Ultimately,
subjective factors determine how different people choose
to split domains and attach labels. If someone chooses
to associate genetic correlations with ‘kin selection’ and
nongenetic associations with ‘correlated selection,’ that
is fine as long as the choice is expressed clearly and un-
derstood as a subjective choice.
In the absence of analyzing particular problems, I
would be inclined to separate kin selection and corre-
lated selection. Those processes seem different, and so it
makes sense to differentiate between them. However, I
have repeatedly found that separating in that way is very
unnatural when actually analyzing particular problems
[15]. Neither the mathematics nor selection distinguish
the way in which phenotypic correlations between social
partners arise. For example, in problems that follow the
structure that led to eqn 11, the causal effect captured
by the phenotypic correlation r depends only on the phe-
notypic association. The genetic aspects of transmission
are handled independently by the τ terms.
For the phenotypic associations, one could choose to
separate the causes of association into shared genotype
and other factors. That separation would distinguish
between a narrow interpretation of kin selection and a
residual component of correlated selection. That separa-
tion can certainly be useful. But repeatedly, in analyzing
particular problems and in developing the underlying ab-
stract theory, the mathematics unambiguously leads one
to blur the distinction when focusing on the causal anal-
ysis of how selection shapes phenotypes. For the partic-
ular causal component that concerns differential success
separated from transmission, it is only the phenotypic
correlations that matter.
Intuition often runs against the lessons urged by logical
and mathematical analyses. That discord is perhaps the
most interesting aspect of mathematics. People tend to
split over that discord. Most trust their intuition above
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all else. Some, having felt the failure of their intuition
too many times in the face of unambiguous logic, give in
to the mathematics. I follow the latter course, in which
it is much better to adjust intuition to mathematics and
logic than to try and bend mathematics and logic to fit
intuition.
In my view, the mathematics of selection has led in-
evitably to certain developments in the theory. Over
time, the theory came to subsume the early ideas of kin
selection into a broader causal perspective. That broader
perspective is much more powerful when trying to an-
alyze particular problems, and much simpler and con-
ceptually deeper when trying to grasp the fundamental
principles of evolutionary change. However, tastes vary.
Others will prefer to separate and label differently. If
one properly understands the underlying theory, differ-
ent labeling causes few problems and ultimately is not a
particularly interesting issue.
DIRECT AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS
Consider two alternative ways to calculate fitness. The
direct fitness method counts only the direct reproduction
of individuals. If an individual behaves altruistically, we
count only the negative effect of that behavior on the
individual. If that individual’s social partners behave al-
truistically, then we add to the direct reproduction of our
focal individual the benefit received from the altruism of
neighbors. To calculate the total effect over the whole
population, we sum up all of the positive and negative
effects on the direct fitness of each individual, based on
the individual’s own phenotype, the phenotype of each in-
dividual’s social partners, and the heritabilities through
different pathways of transmission.
Inclusive fitness alters the assignment of fitness com-
ponents. If an individual behaves altruistically, we assign
two components of fitness to that individual. The nega-
tive cost of altruism reduces the individual’s own repro-
duction. The benefit of altruism to neighbors increases
the neighbors’ reproduction. We assign that increase in
neighbors’ fitness to the original altruistic individual that
caused that increase, rather than directly to the neigh-
bors themselves. We discount the neighbors’ fitness com-
ponent by their genetic similarity to the altruistic indi-
vidual. Thus, the individual that expressed the behavior
is assigned both the direct effect on its own fitness and
the indirect effect on neighbors’ fitness discounted by ge-
netic similarity.
Hamilton’s approach
Hamilton’s mathematical analysis showed that, under
some conditions, inclusive fitness provides the same cal-
culation as direct fitness. Hamilton preferred inclusive
fitness, because it assigns all fitness changes to the behav-
ior that causes the changes. Some of the fitness changes
are direct effects on the individual expressing the behav-
ior, and some of the fitness changes are indirect effects
on other individuals receiving the behavior. This assign-
ment of all fitness effects back to the behavior that caused
them provides a clearer sense of cause and effect. Clear
causal analysis aids in reasoning about the evolution of
complex social behaviors. For example, inclusive fitness
emphasizes that the effects of a behavior on the repro-
duction of passive recipients can play a key role in deter-
mining whether genes associated with the behavior tend
to increase in frequency.
Hamilton understood that direct fitness was the ulti-
mate measure for evolutionary analysis. His mathemati-
cal studies primarily had to do with showing that inclu-
sive fitness was equivalent to direct fitness under many
conditions. Hamilton emphasized inclusive fitness as his
primary contribution to understanding social evolution.
He discussed how inclusive fitness should be regarded as
the fundamental process that encompasses kin selection,
group selection, and other approaches to social interac-
tions between genetically similar individuals [22]. Almost
all debates about the costs and benefits of Hamilton’s ap-
proach and descendant ideas focus on inclusive fitness.
Development of the theory and failure of inclusive
fitness
Since Hamilton’s initial work, the study of social evo-
lution expanded to analyze a broader and more realistic
range of evolutionary problems. In my view, inclusive
fitness has become as much a hindrance as an aid to
understanding. I am not saying that inclusive fitness is
wrong. Inclusive fitness does provide significant insight
into a wide variety of problems. But one must know ex-
actly its limitations, otherwise trouble is inevitable. Re-
alistic biological scenarios arise for which inclusive fit-
ness is important but not sufficient. When one does not
clearly recognize the boundaries then, when faced with
a solution for which inclusive fitness is not sufficient, it
becomes too common to conclude that inclusive fitness
and all broader approaches to kin selection analysis fail
entirely, and one must discard the whole theory.
The issues are somewhat technical in nature. I pro-
vided a full analysis and discussion in Frank [13, 15].
Here, I give a sense of the problem and why it mat-
ters. I begin by briefly summarizing the main points
from the previous section, which distinguished alterna-
tive measures of association between individuals. Sepa-
rating those different kinds of association must be done
clearly in order to understand the distinction between
direct fitness and inclusive fitness.
In the previous analysis leading to eqn 11, two different
classes of individuals interacted. Consider first the direct
fitness of class one individuals. They lose the cost C for
their altruistic behavior. Their social partners from the
same class express an altruistic behavior that provides an
average benefit rB to a member of the class. The B is the
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beneficial trait of partners per unit of costly phenotype
expressed by each individual, and r is the phenotypic
association between the costly behavior of an individual
and the beneficial phenotype of partners. Thus, the to-
tal direct fitness effect on each individual of class one is
proportional to rB−C. The heritability of the altruistic
phenotype for class one individuals is τ1, thus the heri-
table increase in altruism from the direct effect of class
one individuals is (rB − C)τ1.
A second class of individuals does not express the
altruistic phenotype, but may carry genes for that
phenotype—for example, genetic relatives that receive
care but do not give care. The net beneficial effect of
altruism from class one on the direct fitness of class two
individuals is Bˆ. The heritability for class two individu-
als of the altruistic trait expressed by class one individ-
uals is τ2. Thus, the total heritable increase in altruism
through the direct reproduction of class two individuals
is Bˆτ2. Putting the direct fitnesses of the two classes to-
gether and weighting them equally leads to eqn 11 from
the previous section, repeated here for convenience
(rB − C)τ1 + Bˆτ2 > 0.
Note the two different kinds of association, r and τ .
The r coefficient measures the phenotypic association be-
tween the altruistic expression in social partners from
class one. It does not matter how that phenotypic as-
sociation arises. It may be caused by shared genotype,
in which case it is a common type of genetic relatedness
coefficient. Or it may be caused by shared environment,
such as sunlight or temperature, that is independent of
genotype. No matter the cause of the phenotypic asso-
ciation, the direct fitness of class one individuals is pro-
portional to rB−C. The actual value of r is a regression
coefficient, and is sometimes called a coefficient of relat-
edness. However, it is more general than a coefficient of
relatedness, because many different kinds of causes may
be involved. With regard to immediate evolutionary con-
sequences, the cause of the association does not matter.
By contrast, the τ coefficients measure heritability, and
so can reasonably be understood as a measure of geno-
typic contribution to the expression of the altruistic char-
acter. In the case of τ1, the measure is the heritability
through the direct reproduction by an individual that
expresses the altruistic behavior. The τ2 coefficient mea-
sures the direct contribution of class two individuals to
the increase in the altruistic character, even though those
individuals do not express the character. Because Bˆ rep-
resents an increment in fitness caused by the behavior
of class one individuals, the heritability of the altruis-
tic phenotype expressed by class one individuals through
the increment of fitness in class two individuals is pro-
portional to the shared genotype between the class one
actors and the class two recipients.
If class two recipients are genetically unrelated to class
one actors, then τ2 = 0, and the condition for the in-
crease in altruism is rB − C > 0. That has the form
of Hamilton’s rule. However, r measures phenotypic as-
sociation, no matter the underlying cause. It may be
that social partners in class one are genetically unrelated
but phenotypically associated. Nonetheless, rB − C > 0
is still the proper condition, although it is certainly not
an inclusive fitness expression in the manner usually un-
derstood by that theory. One can adjust definitions so
that inclusive fitness still works. But the clearest under-
standing comes from analyzing direct fitness, so that r
carries its natural interpretation as a phenotypic asso-
ciation that may be caused by shared genes or may be
caused by some other shared nongenetic process.
Alternatively, suppose that the phenotypic association
between social partners in class one is zero, r = 0. Then
the condition for the increase in altruism is
−Cτ1 + Bˆτ2 > 0.
Now consider the interpretation of the τ coefficients in
terms of transmission and heritability. The ratio of in-
direct heritability to direct heritability is R = τ2/τ1.
That coefficient, R, is the form of genetic relatedness
commonly used in inclusive fitness theory. For inclusive
fitness, one measures the relative transmission of causal
genes through indirect compared with direct pathways
of reproduction, which is the ratio of heritabilities. If, in
the prior expression, we divide by τ1, and use R = τ2/τ1,
then we have
RB − C > 0,
in which R is the inclusive fitness coefficient of related-
ness. This form is the classic expression of Hamilton’s
rule, which we may interpret with respect to inclusive
fitness.
The direct fitness approach gives the correct analysis in
all cases, with proper interpretation of r as a phenotypic
association between social partners and τ as transmission
to the future through heritability. Inclusive fitness arises
as a special case. By contrast, if one begins with an
inclusive fitness perspective, one has to struggle to get
the right interpretation, and confusion will often arise
with regard to both the analysis and the interpretation.
The actual distinctions between direct and inclusive
fitness are more extensive and more subtle [15, Chapter
4]. Direct fitness typically provides a clear and complete
analysis, and subsumes inclusive fitness as a special case.
Inclusive fitness does have the benefit of an intuitively
appealing causal perspective. However, inclusive fitness
is more limited and more likely to cause confusion. As
understanding of a subject develops, it is natural for yes-
terday’s general understanding to become today’s special
case.
UNDERSTANDING HOW SELECTION SHAPES
PHENOTYPES
Hamilton [2] originally set out to develop a causal de-
composition of social evolution into components. His de-
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composition by inclusive fitness had two steps: the sep-
aration of fitness into components and the analysis of
heritability. With regard to fitness, Hamilton’s approach
partitioned the total effect of a phenotype into the direct
consequence on the actor and the indirect consequence
on social partners. With regard to heritability, Hamil-
ton weighted the different fitness components by their
fidelity of transmission relative to the phenotype in the
focal individual. His coefficient of relatedness measured
the ratio of the heritability through the indirect fitness
component of social partners relative to the heritability
through the direct reproduction by the actor.
Multivariate selection and heritability
Independently of Hamilton’s work, the theory of natu-
ral selection developed during the 1980s and 1990s. That
development primarily followed the influential paper by
Lande and Arnold [115], which built on two earlier lines
of thought. First, Pearson [117] had established the par-
titioning of fitness into distinct components. Second,
Fisher [118] had established the modern principles of her-
itability and the conceptual foundations of quantitative
genetics.
The development of these two lines—the compo-
nents of fitness and the components of heritability—
independently paralleled the two lines in Hamilton’s
thought. In retrospect, the parallel development is not
surprising. Anyone attempting a causal analysis of selec-
tion and evolutionary change would ultimately be led to
those same two essential parts of the problem.
In the early 1980s, I began to develop my own meth-
ods for analyzing phenotypes influenced by kin selection.
I started with the Price equation methods that I inher-
ited from Hamilton’s graduate seminar in 1979. As I
refined my methods of analysis and then eventually gen-
eralized the approach with the help of Peter Taylor, I
was inevitably up against the two problems of partition-
ing fitness into components and tracing pathways of her-
itability. However, until my work with Taylor in 1996, I
had not given much thought to the underlying structure
of the problem.
Following 1996, when I found Queller’s papers that
merged Hamilton’s kin selection theory with the Lande
and Arnold method of multivariate selection and quanti-
tative genetics, I began work on developing that connec-
tion identified by Queller. The result is that kin selection
and inclusive fitness became part of the broader approach
to the study of natural selection [14, 15, 17–19]. With
that advance, it is no longer possible to separate cleanly
between the initial view of kin selection as a special kind
of social problem among genetically similar individuals
and the broader approach of causal analysis for pheno-
types, fitness, and heritability.
From the merging of kin selection theory and the
broader aspects of selection and heritability, problems
like the analysis of altruism between species have come
to look like a kin selection analysis, and classical prob-
lems of kin selection have come to look like a Lande &
Arnold type of analysis of multivariate selection, with the
addition of a more complex analysis of heritability.
Statics and the three measures of value
With regard to studying particular biological prob-
lems, I continue to favor comparative statics for its prag-
matic approach. In analyses of comparative statics, kin
selection problems are transformed into the analysis of
three measures of value: marginal value, reproductive
value, and the valuations of relative transmission [15].
Marginal values transform different phenotypic compo-
nents into common units. Suppose, for example, that we
analyze the marginal costs of a behavior associated with
the direct reproduction of an actor and the marginal ben-
efits of that behavior associated with the indirect effect
on the fitness of a social partner. The relative marginal
valuations provide a substitution, or translation, mea-
sure. That measure tells us, for each small change in phe-
notype, how much the marginal benefits change relative
to how much the marginal costs change. For example,
does a small change in the costs for direct reproduction
translate into a small or a large change in the benefits
for social partners? It is the relative marginal valuations
that give us that translation.
Marginal valuation only applies to the analysis of
small changes. More generally, when one analyzes large
changes, the regression coefficients from multivariate
analysis arise. In that context, the regression coefficients
serve as translations for the relative scaling between dif-
ferent phenotypes and components of fitness [19].
Reproductive value provides a weighting for different
kinds of individuals with respect to their contribution to
the future of the population. Reproductive value is a
component of the transmission of phenotypes. However,
we separate reproductive value from heritability, because
reproductive value usually differs by demographic rather
than genetic aspects. For example, age is a demographic
property, and individuals of different ages have different
reproductive values, although they may have the same
heritability in transmission of their phenotypes. Ecolog-
ical factors, such as available resources or the tendency
for local extinctions of groups, also influence reproduc-
tive valuation. In terms of classical demography, resource
availability may affect birth rates, and local extinctions
of groups may affect death rates.
Valuations of relative transmission, or heritability, ob-
viously play an essential role in tracing the causes of evo-
lutionary change by natural selection. The coefficients of
relatedness in the initial theories of kin selection had to
do with relative heritabilities through different pathways
of transmission. Those coefficients of relatedness are just
special cases of the broader analysis of heritabilities in
the general study of natural selection.
Social evolution and traditional kin selection problems
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raise particular issues with regard to the three measures
of value. However, the analysis of those social aspects
falls within the broader framework of natural selection,
which applies to all problems of selection and the trans-
mission of phenotypes to future generations. This merg-
ing of kin selection and inclusive fitness into the broader
framework for the study of selection has led to deeper un-
derstanding and more powerful analytical approaches. At
the same time, the separate initial history of kin selection
compared with the analysis of nonsocial problems some-
times leads to confusion about the current understanding
of the theory of social evolution.
THE FAILURE OF GROUP SELECTION
Properly understood, then, the origins of an
idea can help to show what its real content is;
what the degree of understanding was before
the idea came along and how unity and clarity
have been attained. But to attain such un-
derstanding we must trace the actual course
of discovery, not some course which we feel
discovery should or could have taken, and we
must see problems (if we can) as the men of
the past saw them, not as we see them today.
In looking for the origin of communication
theory one is apt to fall into an almost track-
less morass. I would gladly avoid this entirely
but cannot, for others continually urge their
readers to enter it. I only hope that they will
emerge unharmed with the help of the follow-
ing grudgingly given guidance [119, pp. 20–
21].
A causal analysis of selection begins by expressing how
phenotypes and other variables influence the fitness of
individuals. In social problems, the characteristics of an
individual’s local group sometimes enter the expression
for individual fitness. If group characters influence fit-
ness, then a causal component of selection is attributed
to the group. That causal component attributed to the
group is one common way in which group selection arises.
Hamilton developed models of group selection by this
partition into individual and group characters. I used
Hamilton’s group selection methods in my own early
studies. Later, I came to understand the limitations and
ultimate failure of the group selection perspective. I then
merged kin selection theory with the general causal anal-
ysis of selection and transmission.
Hamilton’s group selection models
In the 1970s, Hamilton studied social phenotypes in
group structured populations. He analyzed sex ratios and
dispersal polymorphisms of wasps that live in figs [98].
Each fig formed a clearly defined group. He also studied
multigeneration groups of insects and other arthropods
that lived in isolated rotting logs [97]. As always, Hamil-
ton combined his natural history observations with math-
ematical models to analyze natural selection. For these
group structured problems, he followed the hierarchical
multilevel methods of Price [120], as described in Hamil-
ton [22].
Interestingly, a Price equation analysis of group struc-
tured populations is similar to a Lande & Arnold analysis
of multivariate selection. In the case of group structure,
fitness depends on an individual’s phenotype and on the
average phenotype of social partners in the group. That
decomposition of fitness into individual and group com-
ponents, when used in the Price equation, gives a causal
decomposition that ascribes effects to the individual and
group phenotypes. The causal component attributed to
groups may be interpreted as group selection. There is
nothing special about using individual and group pheno-
types in a Price equation analysis of fitness. If one used
an individual’s phenotype, the phenotype of the individ-
ual’s mother, and temperature, one would get a decom-
position in terms of those variables. The analysis works
for any choice of variables that affect fitness.
Lande and Arnold [115] also used the Price equation for
their analysis of multivariate selection. Lande & Arnold’s
approach was in fact very similar to the unpublished
Price equation method Hamilton used to analyze the sex
ratios of fig wasps. However, Hamilton did not interpret
his Price equation method broadly as the multivariate
analysis of selection, but instead followed Price’s limited
interpretation of partitioning individual and group com-
ponents of success.
Following Hamilton, I began my own studies of dis-
persal and sex ratios by thinking in terms of group
structured natural history. The mathematical models
partitioned individual and group components of fitness
[22, 120]. Hamilton was not a committed group selec-
tionist in the sense that began to develop in the 1980s.
Instead, Hamilton interpreted group structure as one way
to get a positive genetic association between individuals,
as emphasized very clearly in the quotes from Hamil-
ton [22] that I presented in an earlier section. To some
extent, Hamilton’s strong focus on group structure arose
from his inability to analyze phenotypes such as dispersal
and sex ratios in terms of kin selection and inclusive fit-
ness. He understood that those processes were the key,
but he could not write down mathematical analyses in
terms of kin selection. He had access to Price’s methods
for group structuring and so used that method instead.
Hamilton was not fully satisfied with his group level
analysis of sex ratios as given in his 1979 notes from
his graduate course at the University of Michigan. He
never published that analysis, perhaps because it showed
only that greater genetic similarity within groups led to
a stronger kin selection effect. That vague point was
already obvious, as he had emphasized in his 1975 ar-
ticle. Simply to show that vague conclusion again for
sex ratios did not add any real insight. Hamilton’s
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class notes are posted as supporting information for this
article in the files WDH notes part1 SuppInfo.pdf and
WDH notes part2 SuppInfo.pdf (see published version in
Journal of Evolutionary Biology, DOI given on first page
of this article).
My early group selection models
I took up the empirical study of fig wasp sex ratios
in 1981. At that time, I also began to study Hamilton’s
notes and to learn how to extend Price’s hierarchical mul-
tilevel selection analysis to apply to my empirical work.
My initial success with that method was limited to seeing
that greater group structuring and more limited migra-
tion increased the genetic similarity of individuals within
groups. The more closely related group members are, the
stronger the kin selection effects.
By the reasoning from Hamilton’s 1975 paper and his
teaching, I understood the equivalence between the kin
selection perspective and the conclusion that the greater
genetic variance among groups, the stronger the tendency
for biased sex ratios. So one could call that a group
selection perspective. But there was always the clear
understanding that the ultimate causal basis arose from
kin selection or inclusive fitness perspectives. I summa-
rized my early understanding of hierarchical multilevel
selection and related group selection analyses in my first
article, A hierarchical view of sex ratio patterns [121].
In my early work, I focused only on group structured
populations. I maintained an unbiased dual perspective
between kin and group selection. However, in that early
work, I made limited progress toward teasing apart how
selection influenced sex ratio evolution. I was stuck at
the same vague group selection perspective that stopped
Hamilton. I slowly figured out how to move ahead. Par-
ticular sex ratio models played a key role—the synergism
between application and abstraction.
In a particular study, I analyzed the case in which
males competed for mates locally within groups, females
competed for resources against neighboring females, and
the males and females migrated varying distances before
mating. I then traced the causal processes that deter-
mined the evolution of the sex ratio. Assuming that the
mother controlled the sex ratio of her progeny, one could
adopt the mother’s perspective with regard to pathways
of causation. This new work grew from Price and Hamil-
ton’s multilevel selection analyses, reflected in the title
of a key article, Hierarchical selection theory and sex ra-
tios. I. General solutions for structured populations [92].
Although that article emphasized hierarchical multilevel
selection, it also placed the group structured perspective
into its proper role: a special case within the broader
analysis of phenotypes by kin selection theory.
Pathways of causation replace group selection
In the group structured sex ratio models, one can sep-
arate several distinct causes with respect to kin interac-
tions. For example, the value of an additional son de-
pends on the mother’s genetic relatedness to the males
that her sons compete with for mates. Greater related-
ness reduces the transmission benefit to a mother for an
additional son. We can express the effect as the marginal
gain in mating success through an additional son multi-
plied by the relative heritability of the mother’s sex ratio
trait through sons minus the marginal loss in mating suc-
cess among competing males multiplied by the heritabil-
ity of the mother’s sex ratio trait through those compet-
ing males.
The value of an additional daughter depends on the
mother’s genetic relatedness to the females that her
daughters compete with for access to resources. Greater
relatedness reduces the transmission benefit to a mother
for an additional daughter. We can express the effect as
the marginal gain in reproductive success for an addi-
tional daughter multiplied by the relative heritability of
the mother’s sex ratio trait through daughters minus the
marginal loss in reproductive success among competing
females multiplied by the heritability of the mother’s sex
ratio trait through those competing females. In addition
to the direct contributions through each sex, there are
also effects of one sex on the other. For example, an
extra daughter may provide additional mating opportu-
nities for sons.
The full analysis showed how various causal pathways
influence the predicted sex ratio [91–93]. Those pathways
often include the genetic associations between competi-
tors, measured by coefficients of relatedness. Typically,
a coefficient of relatedness can be expressed either as the
genetic variance between groups divided by the total ge-
netic variance in the population, or as a regression co-
efficient that measures the genetic correlation between
interacting individuals. The two interpretations are sim-
ply alternative expressions for the same measure. The
first, group based expression for the measure suggests a
group selection interpretation, whereas the second, indi-
vidual based expression suggests a kin-centric interpre-
tation. However, the measure is the same in both cases
[15, 92].
The problem with the group-based interpretation is
that different causal pathways may be associated with
different patterns of grouping. Or there may not be any
natural grouping. The pairwise correlations of kin se-
lection theory do not require group structure. If there is
no group structure, kin selection works perfectly whereas
group selection fails.
Group selection, which initially provided a nice intu-
itive way to think about group structured populations,
ultimately proved to be the limitation in understanding
the evolution of phenotypes. Inevitably, I had to return
to the fundamental causal level, in which the correlations
between individual phenotypes and the different path-
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ways of heritability were made clear.
Once at the proper level of causation, one could see
that emphasis on groups hindered analysis. The proper
view always derives from the causes of fitness and the
pathways of transmission. The different causes of fitness
rarely follow along a single pattern of grouping. For ex-
ample, males may interact over one spatial scale, females
may interact over another spatial scale, and mating be-
tween males and females may occur on a third scale. It is
relatively easy to trace cause by the correlations between
phenotypes, the ecological context of resource distribu-
tion, and the pathways of genetic transmission. Those
causal components do not naturally follow the sort of
rigid grouping needed for a group selection analysis to
work.
The last paragraph of Frank [92] emphasized how anal-
ysis of particular biological problems led to a deeper un-
derstanding of causal process:
In summary, all three theories—inbreeding,
within-sex competition among relatives, and
group selection truly describe causal mecha-
nisms of biased sex ratios in structured pop-
ulations. Through the study of a variety of
scenarios with hierarchical selection theory,
I draw the following conclusions. First, in-
breeding biases the sex ratio since producing
a daughter that inbreeds . . . passes on twice
as many parental genes as producing a son
would. Second, as the amount of within-
sex competition among related individuals
increases, the relative genetic valuation of
that sex decreases. Third, genetic differentia-
tion among groups . . . and genetic correlation
within groups . . . are related descriptions for
the same phenomenon. Some recent papers
[122, 123] have stressed the group selection
aspect of this phenomenon without clarifying
its similarity to genetic relatedness. Using
group selection for describing causal mech-
anisms is particularly slippery, since, as in
the various scenarios presented in this paper,
the differentiation among groups may refer to
groups of competing males, groups of compet-
ing females, or groups that contain inbreed-
ing pairs. While hierarchical selection the-
ory, which is a group selection sort of analy-
sis, has proved a powerful analytical tool, it
seems that, for describing causal mechanisms,
it is often useful to apply the genetic regres-
sions [kin selection coefficients] considered in
the discussion.
Logically, there cannot be a group selection
controversy
Two conclusions emphasize the failure of group selec-
tion. First, the ultimate causal processes concern cor-
relations between phenotypes and pathways of genetic
transmission. Group structuring is just one limited way
in which phenotypic correlations and genetic transmis-
sion pathways may be influenced. Second, insisting on
a group perspective greatly limits the practical appli-
cation of the theory to natural history. Most natural
history problems do not have a single rigid group struc-
ture shared by all causal processes. If one starts with
a group selection perspective, solving problems becomes
extremely difficult or impossible. No gain in understand-
ing offsets the loss in analysis.
Although group selection has problems that limit its
scope, it also has attractive features. There is a natural
intuitive simplicity in group structured analysis. Total
selection arises from the balance between the dynamics
of selection within groups and the dynamics of selection
between groups. Altruistic characters often tend to lose
out during selection within groups and often tend to in-
crease by selection between groups. The problem is that
once people gain such intuition, they do not easily give it
up in the face of the inevitable conceptual and practical
limitations. Like the growth of any kind of understand-
ing, one must allow the first general insights to become
the special cases of broader conceptual and analytical
approaches. Pinning a topic to the first simple illustra-
tive model limits progress. Concepts and their associated
language naturally develop and transform over time.
Given this history, the idea of a group selection con-
troversy seems to me to be a logical absurdity. I do un-
derstand the intuitive appeal of group selection. I was
trained by Hamilton to think about the interesting prop-
erties of groups and about the dynamical processes of
within-group and between-group selection. I also learned
from Hamilton the mathematical techniques to analyze
multilevel selection. My early conversion, however, did
not last. Both the conceptual and practical limitations
became apparent as I tried to make progress in under-
standing various problems of natural history and the
mathematical models needed to evaluate those problems.
In summary, when groups are the cause of genetic as-
sociations, then group structuring is the causal basis for
the associations that drive kin selection. When group
structuring is less clear, the principles of kin selection
still hold, as they must.
However, the controversy continues
The Los Angeles Times newspaper published an inter-
view with E. O. Wilson on September 19, 2012. With
regard to kin and group selection, the interviewer began:
The biologist J.B.S. Haldane explained “kin
selection” when he was asked whether he
would lay down his life for his brother. No,
he said, but he would for two brothers, or
eight cousins. In the journal “Nature” in 2010
[52], you challenged kin selection and created
a stir, to say the least.
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Wilson replied (the following is an exact unmodified ty-
pographic transcription of the published article)
I was one of the main promoters of kin selec-
tion back when it looked good. By the ‘90s
I thought I heard the whine of wheels spin-
ning. Willie Hamilton’s [British evolutionary
biologist W.D. Hamilton] generalized rule [of
kin selection] was that if you’ve got enough
people looking after [relatives], society could
become very advanced. It wasn’t working.
By 2010 I had published peer-reviewed ar-
ticles on what was thoroughly wrong [with
kin selection]. I said we’ve got to go back
to “multilevel selection.” Groups form, com-
peting with one another for their share. It’s
paramount in human behavior. The spoils
tend to go to groups that do things better—
in business, development, war and so on.
I knew the biology. I saw that multiple-level
selection works, but in different ways in dif-
ferent cases, and [with] my mathematical col-
leagues, said [in the Nature article], kin selec-
tion cannot work. We knew that was going
to be a paradigm changer. We published it
and the storm broke.
I agree with the three key points emphasized by Wilson
in his article [52]: that multilevel selection is important;
that one should think about group selection in human so-
ciality; and that kin selection in relation to haplodiploidy
is not sufficient to explain insect sociality. However, I do
have a different perspective on some of the conceptual
issues and the history of the subject.
Multilevel selection
I have emphasized Hamilton’s own interest in multi-
level selection. Thus, Wilson’s way of opposing kin selec-
tion versus multilevel selection does not make any sense
to me. To expand briefly on this point with regard to
human sociality, note that Hamilton’s [22] primary pub-
lication on multilevel selection had the title Innate social
aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genet-
ics. In that article, Hamilton first developed his theoret-
ical perspective on human evolution by extending Price’s
[120] hierarchical selection methods. Hamilton then de-
voted approximately ten pages to group level perspec-
tives on human sociality.
In Hamilton’s [124] collected works, he gave the
reprinted version of this article [22] the secondary title
Friends, Romans, Groups, and wrote in the preface for
the article:
[I] am proud to have included the first pre-
sentation of Price’s natural selection formal-
ism as applied to group-level processes. . . .
He [Price] himself published one application
of the formula to groups but I think it was
less explicit and general than mine, indeed
almost as if he was trying still to conceal his
formula’s full significance [120]. For myself, I
consider the format of analysis [for multilevel
selection] I was able to achieve through his
idea brilliantly illuminating.
Kin versus group selection in human sociality
Alexander [125, 126] built his comprehensive evolu-
tionary analysis of human sociality on the importance
of group against group competition. In developing the
theoretical foundations for his analysis, Alexander had
thoroughly reviewed issues of group selection. He ex-
pressed his thinking on this topic in an article with the
title Group selection, altruism, and the levels of organi-
zation of life [127].
I took my first undergraduate course in evolution from
Alexander at the University of Michigan in 1978. His
views on multilevel selection in Alexander and Borgia
[127] were particularly important in shaping how I un-
derstood the subject. Interestingly, Alexander was not
much influenced by Hamilton’s multilevel selection anal-
ysis, which derived from the mathematical theories of
Price. Instead, Alexander was an entomologist with a
deep interest in human behavior. He developed his think-
ing from broad consideration of natural history.
A comment on the first page of Alexander and Borgia
[127] provides historical context
[E]volution by differential extinction of
groups has recently been modelled or dis-
cussed anew by several authors . . . E. O. Wil-
son [128], for example, has argued that “In
the past several years a real theory of inter-
population selection has begun to be forged,
with both enriched premises and rigorous
model building. . . . Insofar as the new theory
considers the results of counteraction between
group and individual selection, it will produce
complex, nonobvious results that constitute
testable alternatives to the hypothesis of in-
dividual selection. My own intuitive feeling
is that interpopulation selection is important
in special cases.”
Clearly, Wilson has long given thought to the potential
importance of group structuring in nature. The point
here is that this line of thought goes back over 40 years,
with much debate about conceptual issues and the rela-
tive importance for understanding natural history. How-
ever, most theories conclude that differential extinction
of groups is usually a relatively weak force [129]. Only
Hamilton’s milder version of group structuring in rela-
tion to differential reproduction and genetic differentia-
tion between groups seems to be on solid ground as an
explanation for common patterns of natural history.
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I have argued throughout that Hamilton’s type of mul-
tilevel selection is clearly a special case within the broader
theory of kin selection. Although group extinctions are
usually thought to be outside the scope of kin selection
theory, the merging of demography and kin selection by
Taylor and Frank [103] and Frank [15] brings those differ-
ent processes within a single coherent theoretical frame-
work. Bringing together those different processes is more
than just a theoretical convenience.
Suppose, for example, that a particular problem re-
quires analyzing how an altruistic phenotype evolves.
That phenotype may affect the probability of extinction
for its group. Its group may be composed of genetically
similar individuals, perhaps kin in the traditional sense.
The phenotype may also have other costs and benefits
with regard to interacting with social partners. It is too
hard to figure out what to expect by separately analyzing
extinctions, group variations in genetics, social processes
of costs and benefits, and other processes. Nowak et al.
[52] say that one must make a specific model for a specific
case, and then one gets the right answer. True, but the
history of science shows unambiguously that one gains a
lot by understanding the abstract causal principles that
join different cases and different models within a common
framework [17]. That truth leaves only the sort of causal
perspective I have emphasized as a reasonable candidate
for how to think about such problems.
Certainly, not everyone agrees with me. Alexander
and Borgia [127] understood Hamilton’s [22] claim that
group selection was just a special case of kin selection.
However, they rejected that point of view
That groups are often composed of kin does
not mean that kin selection and group selec-
tion are in any sense synonymous [32, 130–
132]. As West-Eberhard [133] points out,
“In the same trivial sense that kin selection
is group selection, all of natural selection is
group selection, since even ‘individual’ se-
lection really concerns the summed genetic
contribution of a group—the individual’s off-
spring.” Moreover, although kin selection
can occur in continuously distributed pop-
ulations, group selection cannot. For rea-
sons elaborated later, we agree with May-
nard Smith [134] that it is more appropriate
to distinguish kin selection and group selec-
tion than to blur their differences by consid-
ering them together.
This quote shows the clear historical precedent for Wil-
son’s argument that multilevel selection is distinct from
kin selection. As often happens with historical analyses
of ideas in science, one can find significant antecedents
that support a variety of different positions. Because
a controversy about kin and group selection will always
come down to how one chooses to interpret words, there
can be no final resolution.
What we can say, unambiguously, is that Hamilton
never argued for a distinction between multilevel analy-
sis and kin selection. Instead, he saw multilevel analy-
sis as one of the most powerful approaches to thinking
about the general problems that arise in applications of
his theory. My own view follows Hamilton. In addition,
the mathematics do not allow a logical distinction. Any
distinction must be injected by a particular bias with
respect to how one uses the words and interprets the his-
tory. However, as long as the historical and conceptual
issues are made clear, it does not matter to me how one
chooses to use the words. Indeed, given how clearly we
understand the theory, it puzzles me why so much atten-
tion and argument continues to focus on this issue.
Returning to Alexander and Borgia [127], their main
point concerned how we should think about human evo-
lution. In their concluding remarks about humans, they
state
Human social groups represent an almost
ideal model for potent selection at the group
level [23, 135–137]. First, the human species
is composed of competing and essentially hos-
tile groups that have not only behaved to-
ward one another in the manner of differ-
ent species but have been able quickly to
develop enormous differences in reproductive
and competitive ability because of cultural
innovation and its cumulative effects. Sec-
ond, human groups are uniquely able to plan
and act as units, to look ahead, and to carry
out purposely actions designed to sustain the
group and improve its competitive position,
whether through restricting disruptive behav-
ior from within the group or through direct
collective action against competing groups.
Alexander and Borgia [127] certainly understood the
broader implications of multilevel selection analysis with
regard to a variety of biological problems. The first para-
graph of their summary is
[T]here may be few problems in biology more
basic or vital than understanding the back-
ground and the potency of selection at dif-
ferent levels in the hierarchies of organization
of living matter. The approaches currently
being used by evolutionary ecologists and be-
haviorists in assessing the likelihood of effec-
tive selection at the level of groups or pop-
ulations of individuals may also be used to
advantage by those concerned with function
at intragenomic levels. The kind of selection-
ist techniques used recently to analyze the
behavior of nonhuman organisms may in the
near future be widely applied toward under-
standing not only human social phenomena,
but a variety of phenomena of classical biol-
ogy such as mitosis, meiosis, sex determina-
tion, segregation distortion, linkage, cancer,
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immune reactions, and essentially all prob-
lems in gene function and in ontogeny.
The year 1978 was a long time ago. I do not understand
why these ideas are still thought of as novel or controver-
sial.
Insect sociality
Wilson particularly emphasized the failure of kin selec-
tion theory in explaining the evolution of advanced so-
ciality in insects [52]. Once again, we must consider what
is meant by the scope of kin selection theory. I tend to
think of kin selection as a particular causal perspective
within the broader theory of natural selection. Although
it is tempting to limit the scope of kin selection theory
to certain simple scenarios and predictions, such limits
never make sense in the logical or mathematical analysis
of the subject. However, to the extent that others choose
to distinguish more finely, that does not bother me as
long as the concepts and history are made clear.
For those who view kin selection narrowly, the poten-
tial problems of that narrow theoretical view for under-
standing the origin of complex sociality (eusociality) in
insects was a lively topic in the 1970s and 1980s. An-
dersson [34] introduces his excellent review of the topic
by noting that eusociality has arisen multiple times in
insects. He then turns to an early theory based on kin
selection to explain why eusociality is particularly com-
mon in bees, ants, and wasps (Hymenoptera).
Hamilton’s [10, 11] celebrated explanation is
that haplodiploid sex determination in Hy-
menoptera makes sisters share three quar-
ters of their genes, whereas a daughter only
receives half her genome from her mother.
Hymenopteran females may therefore prop-
agate their genes better by helping to raise
reproductive sisters than by raising daugh-
ters of their own. Haplodiploidy therefore
should make the evolution of nonreproduc-
tive female workers particularly likely among
the Hymenoptera. This and other stimulat-
ing ideas of Hamilton’s started a revolution
in the study of social behavior, particularly
of the role of kin selection [25, 84].
Several entomologists have warned against
overemphasis on the 3/4 relatedness hypothe-
sis, and they have pointed to other factors im-
portant in the evolution of eusociality [23, 32,
35, 138–145]. Hamilton [10, 11, 85] and Wil-
son [31] also noted that haplodiploidy alone
cannot explain eusociality in Hymenoptera.
Such reservations were often forgotten, how-
ever, and the 3/4 hypothesis came to dom-
inate many textbook and popular accounts.
For example, in his comprehensive review
of social behavior in animals, Wilson [132,
p. 415] stated that “the key to Hymenopteran
success is haplodiploidy” and that “nothing
but kin selection seems to explain the sta-
tistical dominance of eusociality by the Hy-
menoptera” [132, p. 418]. A long list of simi-
lar evaluations of the 3/4 relatedness hypoth-
esis by other authors could be cited.
The main empirical evidence in favor of the
3/4 hypothesis is that eusociality seems to
have arisen many more times in the hap-
lodiploid Hymenoptera than in other insects
[31, 35]. This evidence initially appeared im-
pressive, but several recent findings indicate
that haplodiploidy and 3/4 relatedness be-
tween sisters may have been of limited impor-
tance for the evolution of eusociality. Other
factors have clearly been involved, and it
seems possible that haplodiploidy has even
been insignificant compared to these factors.
At least five lines of evidence cast doubt on
the overwhelming importance sometimes as-
cribed to haplodiploidy [and the narrowly de-
fined kin selection hypothesis].
The further details do not concern us here. The main
point is that by 1984, the problems with a narrow inter-
pretation of kin selection for explaining eusociality had
been widely discussed.
Summary
Inevitably, the debates about kin selection and group
selection will continue, because the ultimate problem
concerns different usage of words. People vary in whether
they prefer to emphasize differences or similarities be-
tween components of a broader problem. Those who like
differences emphasize distinctions between kinship inter-
actions and group structuring of populations. Those who
like similarities see kin and group selection as part of a
broader theory of natural selection. So what? Perhaps
the debate can advance a bit by a more nuanced consid-
eration of the underlying concepts and history.
DISCUSSION
Separation into component causes
Kin selection theory analyzes the evolutionary causes
of social phenotypes. Causal analysis is not an alter-
native to other analyses, such as population genetics.
Rather, causal analysis brings out the factors that one
must emphasize to understand pattern. Why do pheno-
types vary in the way that they do? What matters most?
What factors should one focus on to make testable pre-
dictions?
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Hamilton separated evolutionary change into three
causes. A direct component affects the individual that
expresses a phenotype—the cost. An indirect compo-
nent affects social partners influenced by the focal indi-
vidual’s phenotype—the benefit. To combine those two
components into the total evolutionary effect on the phe-
notype, one must adjust the indirect component to have
the same units as the direct component. The adjust-
ment translates the indirect component of change into
an equivalent amount of direct change. That translation
is often a genetic measure of similarity between the in-
dividuals affected directly and indirectly—the coefficient
of relatedness.
Note the structure of causal analysis. The total change
is what matters. To understand that total change, we
separate it into parts that help to reason about the prob-
lem. Once we have a set of distinct parts, we have to
combine those parts back into a common measure for to-
tal change. To combine properly, each part is weighted
by a factor that translates into a consequence for total
change. Separation into distinct causal processes leads to
testable predictions about which causal components ex-
plain patterns of variation. Separation also highlights the
common causal basis that unites previously unconnected
problems within a common conceptual framework.
Causal analysis by kin selection is never an alternative
to other analyses of total change. Rather, it is a pow-
erful complement to other approaches. In practice, kin
selection can be so powerful in analysis and so helpful
in the conceptual framing of problems, that one does not
need other complementary methods. However, determin-
ing the best methods always depends on the particular
goals. For example, in the study of alternative genetic as-
sumptions and complex aspects of dynamics, population
genetic models provide superior methods.
Hamilton’s rule
Confusion over Hamilton’s rule arises when it is not
properly understood as a partitioning of causes. The rule
is the partition of total change for a social phenotype into
direct and indirect components. It does not make sense
to consider whether the rule is true or false. Rather,
following Hamilton, one thinks of the rule in two ways.
First, is there a simple form for the partition of causes
that matches the ultimate measure of total change, at
least approximately and under particular conditions? If
so, what are the proper definitions for the components?
Second, how should we expand Hamilton’s original causal
partition for more complex problems?
Roughly speaking, Hamilton’s original expression in
terms of costs, benefits, and genetic relatedness provided
a useful partition that works for simple problems. How-
ever, as the theory was applied to more realistic prob-
lems, the associated causal analysis had to be extended.
The modern theory of kin selection provides a more com-
prehensive causal analysis. Multiple direct and indirect
components of fitness may occur. Costs and benefits
are understood to depend on context. Relatedness co-
efficients and their generalization by multiple regression
coefficients translate all fitness components into com-
mon units of total change. Separation between selection
and transmission clarifies the distinctions between causal
components.
Methods of analysis for solving problems have been
developed to complement the causal decomposition. The
limitations of the analytical methods and the causal de-
compositions are reasonably well understood. Causal
decomposition and simplified analysis provide tools to
enhance understanding rather than alternatives to more
complex and detailed mathematical analyses of particu-
lar problems.
Limitations of inclusive fitness
Hamilton introduced inclusive fitness as a particular
type of causal partition. Inclusive fitness assigns an in-
direct fitness effect through a social partner back to the
behavior that caused the fitness effect. For example, if
an individual saves its sibling’s life, that fitness benefit is
attached to the individual who saved the life rather than
the individual whose life was saved. That fitness benefit
is discounted by the genetic relatedness of the savior to
the sibling.
Inclusive fitness has the advantage of assigning changes
in components of fitness to the phenotype that caused
those changes. That causal decomposition can provide
much insight into evolutionary process. The problem
arises because that very particular form of causal par-
titioning is often equated with the entire theory of kin
selection. Instead, it is much better to view kin selec-
tion as a general approach to the causal analysis of social
processes. Inclusive fitness is a particular causal decom-
position that helps in some cases and not in others.
For example, phenotypic associations between social
partners that do not share a common genotype can have
a very powerful effect on social evolution. Inclusive fit-
ness fails as a complete analysis of correlated phenotypes
between social partners. That failure does not mean we
should give up on trying to understanding the causes
of social evolution in such cases, or that we should con-
clude that kin selection theory fails as a general approach.
Instead, we must understand the broader approach of
causal analysis, and how different aspects of natural his-
tory should be understood from a broader causal per-
spective. That broader perspective was developed many
years ago and has proved to be a powerful tool for ana-
lyzing complex social interactions.
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Correlated social phenotypes versus genetic
relatedness
When correlated social phenotypes do not arise from
shared genotype, how should we think of the relatedness
coefficients of kin selection theory? Proper causal anal-
ysis solves the problem. Changes in phenotypes cause
changes in fitness. Those fitness changes must be trans-
lated into changes in the transmission of phenotypes to
the future population. In analyzing the causes of fitness
and the causes of transmission, we must put all the com-
ponents together into a common measure of total change.
The weighting of the different components leads to dif-
ferent types of regression coefficients. Those regression
coefficients are the translations of different causal com-
ponents into a common scale.
The fact that Hamilton’s original theory considered
only a very particular aspect of transmission and genetic
relatedness has led to confusion. Hamilton’s original re-
gression coefficient of relatedness is not the single defining
relatedness and regression coefficient of kin selection the-
ory. Rather, it is the particular coefficient that arises in
the special inclusive fitness analysis that Hamilton con-
sidered in developing his theory.
Synergism between abstraction and application
Abstraction arises by recognizing the common pro-
cesses that recur in different cases. Application demands
analysis of particular phenotypes under particular cir-
cumstances. Kin selection theory grew naturally by the
synergism between abstraction and application. Hamil-
ton pulled out the first clear abstraction that united vari-
ous simple applications. Yet he could not use his abstract
theory to move on to new applications. In particular, he
could not solve the problems of dispersal and sex ratios
that arose from kin interactions.
As the applied theory eventually developed for dis-
persal, sex ratios and more complex social phenotypes,
deeper abstract principles emerged. For example, the
distinction between selection and transmission became
clear, and relatedness coefficients became a part of trans-
lating causal components into common units. The im-
provements in abstract theory enhanced the scope of ap-
plication to complex social phenotypes.
The necessary synergism between abstraction and ap-
plication showed the ultimate failure of group selection.
In particular, group selection is a useful abstraction for
a limited set of applications. When faced with a variety
of applications, such as sex ratio evolution with multiple
male and female interactions, group selection fails. In-
stead of the limited perspective of group selection, the
deeper abstract principles dominate. Those principles
include a clear causal analysis of distinct fitness compo-
nents, separation of selection and transmission, and the
proper weighting of the distinct causal components to
attain an overall analysis of total change.
When different people focus exclusively on either ab-
straction or application, deep tension and fruitless debate
arise. When the two modes come together, great progress
follows.
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